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I INTRODUCTION 
In New Zealand, Part VI of the Commerce Act 1986 
("NZCA") formulates the range 
of penalties that are available for breaches of comp
etition law.
1 Such penalties include 
cease and desist orders, pecuniary penalties, in
junctions and other orders, fines, 
damages, and the divestiture of assets and shares.
2 It is the aim of the first part of this 
paper to analyse, both in theory and in practice
, how these penalties operate. In 
addition, this paper also discusses whether thes
e penalties adequately satisfy the 
objectives of competition law penalties. 
An analysis of the competition law penalties of oth
er jurisdictions also provides a tool 
for examining and assessing the effectiveness o
f the New Zealand system. For 
example, in Canada, their Competition Act 1985
 ("CCA") contains both civil and 
criminal penalties with which to enforce their com
petition law.
3 Conversely, the law 
of the United Kingdom is similar to New Zealand
 in that it only has civil provisions 
available to penalise infringements of their Compet
ition Act 1998 ("UKCA").
4 In July 
2001, however, the United Kingdom governmen
t announced that they intend to 
modify competition law in order to make partic
ipation in a cartel punishable by 
criminal penalties.
5 This paper, therefore, will also outline and analys
e competition 
law penalties in these two jurisdictions in order to
 suggest options for reforming the 
New Zealand system. 
1 This paper uses the term "penalties" to refer to all t
he remedies that are available for competition law 
breaches. For example, and without limiting its inte
nded meaning, this term would include injunctions,
 
pecuniary penalties, damages and the like. This p
aper will indicate when it does not intend one to 
interpret "penalties" in this broad manner. The t
ext of this paper is 14,962 words (not including
 
footnotes, contents page and bibliography). 
2 Commerce Act 1986, Part VI. Section 80E of the 
NZCA also contains a criminal sanction, but this 
only applies when a person breaches a court order 
made under section 80C relating to the exclusion of
 
a person from the management of a body corpor
ate. It is not, therefore, a direct competition law 
penalty. 
3 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), Parts IV, VI, VII a
nd VIII. 
4 Competition Act 1998 (UK), ss 32-36. 
5 White Paper: A World Class Competition Regime 3
1 July 2001. The government, however, made the 
initial announcement in June 2001. See: Graham 
P Smith "Criminalising U.K. Competition Law: A
 
Step Too Far?" (2001) 12(12) ICCLR 291. 
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One of the main issues relating to penalties in competition law is the role of criminal 
sanctions. As mentioned above, of the three jurisdictions that this paper discusses in 
detail, only Canada currently has criminal sanctions available for breaches of 
competition Iaw.6 The New Zealand Ministry of Commerce, however, as recently as 
1998, has stated that "there is a case for criminal penalties as punishment for hard 
core cartel offences."
7 Consequently, the third part of this paper discusses the 
possibility of criminal penalties for competition law violations in detail and 
determines whether such penalties would be appropriate in the New Zealand context. 
Altogether, this paper contains three main parts. First, Part II outlines competition law 
penalties in New Zealand and assesses their effectiveness. Part III discusses the law of 
the United Kingdom and Canada relating to competition law penalties and raises some 
possible ways to reform the New Zealand system. Given the discussion in Parts II and 
III, Part IV will then investigate one reform option in more detail: criminal penalties. 
Overall, this paper shows that, currently in New Zealand, penalties for breaches of 
competition laws are not as effective as is required. A major way, however, that the 
New Zealand Parliament could improve this effectiveness is to provide for criminal 
penalties in the NZCA. 
II COMPETITION LAW PENALTIES IN NEW ZEALAND 
Historically in New Zealand, courts could enforce certain violations of competition 
law via criminal proceedings.
8 Part VI of the NZCA, however, does not contain any 
such provisions, and therefore has completely "decriminalised" New Zealand 
competition law.9 Instead, New Zealand's focus is on using and expanding the current 
6 See: Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 45. 
7 Ministry of Commerce "Penalties, Remedies and Court Processes Under the Commerce Act 1986: A 
Discussion Document" (Ministry of Commerce, Wellington, 1998). 
8 See: Commerce Act 1975, s 58; Trade Practices Act 1958, s 23C; Commercial Trusts Act 1910, s 10; 
Bernard M Hill and Mark R Jones Competitive Trading in New Zealand: The Commerce Act 1986 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1986) 166. 
9 Hill & Jones, above n 8, 166. As stated previously, section 80E is not a direct competition law 
penalty. 
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range of civil penalties available for competition law breaches under the NZCA.
10 
This part outlines these civil penalties individually and assesses their effectiveness. 
First, however, this part identifies the traits that make competition law penalties 
effective. 
A Effectiveness 
Academics generally agree that there are six main objectives of punishment. These 
are rehabilitation, incapacitation, retribution, reparation, and specific and general 
deterrence. 11In relation to competition law, each of these may be a legitimate purpose 
of the penalties. 
1 Rehabilitation 
The rehabilitation objective provides that the courts may direct punishment against an 
offender in order to COlTe~t their behaviour.
12 For example, in the competition law 
context, this could be an aim of pecuniary penalties or fines, as they may force the 
offender to see the error of their ways and to correct their behaviour. Strictly 
speaking, however, rehabilitation aims at placing the offender in certain programmes 
that enable them to re-enter the community.
13 In relation to competition law penalties, 
however, the court has no power to place an offender in any such rehabilitative 
programs and, arguably, these offenders do not even need . rehabilitation.
14 
Consequently, although rehabilitation may be a beneficial by-product of competition 
1° Commerce Act 1986, Part VI; Commerce Amendment Act 2001, ss 15, 17 & 18; Hill & Jones, above 
n 8, 166. 
11 See: M Golding "Punishment: Retribution" in M Golding (ed) Philosophy of Law (Prentice-Hall, 
New Jersey, 1975) 84-105; C Roberson "Purpose of Criminal Sanctions" in C Roberson (ed) 
Introduction to Corrections (Copperhouse, Nevada, 1997) 13-21. 
12 Roberson, above n 11, 18. 
13 Roberson,aboven 11, 18. 
14 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 8. Conversely, however, one could argue there is no difference 
between those who breach competition law and those who commit violent crime. My view is that it is 
arguable that many competition law offenders do require rehabilitation, but this is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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penalties, it is clear that Parliament has not created such penalties with rehabilitation 
as its objective. 
2 Incapacitation 
Secondly, incapacitation aims at confining the offender as a means to prevent them 
from committing future offences against innocent people.
15 In some sense, one can 
see how competition law penalties may achieve this objective: penalties such as 
injunctions and cease and desist orders prevent the offender from committing 
competition law violations in the future by restraining the offender's behaviour. 
Parliament, however, generally satisfies this objective via the use of imprisonment 
and the NZCA does not give the courts any such power.
16 Again, therefore, although 
they may achieve this objective in some sense, one should not measure the 
effectiveness of competition law penalties in reference to the incapacitation objective. 
3 Retribution 
Thirdly, the retributive objective of punishment states that society needs to punish the 
offender for their wrongdoing.
17 Commonly, academics refer to this as providing the 
offender with their "just desserts" and state that the degree of punishment must fit the 
seriousness of the offence.
18 In relation to competition law, sanctions such as 
pecuniary penalties and fines may fulfil this objective by punishing the offender for 
their offence. For example, Smithers J stated that penalties under the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974 "should constitute a real punishment proportionate to the 
deliberation with which the defendant contravened the provisions of the Act."
19 In my 
opinion, it is clear that retribution is a legitimate aim of competition law penalties, and 
15 Roberson, above n 11, 17. 
16 See: Roberson, above n 11, 17. 
17 Golding, above n 11, 84. 
18 Roberson, above n 11, 15. 
19 TPC v. Stihl Chainsaws 1978 ATPR 30-091. 
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to be effective therefore, they must be serious enough to fulfil society's desire to 
punish the offender for the violation. 
4 Reparation 
The reparation objective of punishment is straightforward, and maintains that the 
offender should compensate the victims of the violation for the loss that they suffered. 
In relation to competition law penalties, damages can fulfil this objective by providing 
the victim of the violation with monetary compensation for their loss. The other 
competition law penalties, however, do not attempt to fulfil this aim, as the victim 
does not receive any compensation.
20 In relation to damages, however, reparation is a 
legitimate purpose, and therefore to be effective, damages should adequately 
compensate the victim. 
5 Deterrence 
Finally, the theory of deterrence claims that punishment can affect future behaviour 
and can consequently prevent future offences. Specific deterrence attempts to deter a 
particular offender by punishing them to such an extent that they will not commit 
similar offences in the future. General deterrence tries to deter others from 
committing a similar crime by punishing a certain individual who has committed an 
offence.21 In relation to competition law, it is obvious that both types of deterrence 
can be an objective of the penalties. The Ministry of Commerce has stated that 
deterring all future competition law offences is the main aim of the penalties under the 
NZCA,22 which seems to encompass both specific and general deterrence. In addition, 
academics and the New Zealand courts have stated that deterrence is a major aim of 
the competition law penalties.
23 Overall, therefore, when assessing the effectiveness 
of such penalties, deterrence will be the most important consideration. 
20 For example, the offender pays pecuniary penalties to the Crown. 
21 Roberson, above n 11, 16. 
22 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 3 
23 See: Jill Mallon and Jenny Stevens "Penalties for Corporate Offenders" (2001) NZLJ 389; Jill 
Mallon and Jenny Stevens "Commerce Act Penalties for Individuals" (2001) NZLJ 339; Commerce 
Commission v. Herberts Bakery Ltd (1991) 2 NZLR 726 (HC). 
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In sum, the main aim of competition law penalties is deterrence. Retribution, however 
will also be relevant, as will reparation in relation to damages. Given these aims, this 
paper now discusses the penalties available to the courts under the NZCA and their 
effectiveness. 
B Current Penalties in the NZCA 
1 Pecuniary Penalties 
If the High Court finds that an individual has breached a provision in the NZCA 
relating to restrictive trade practices, the court can impose a pecuniary penalty of up 
to $500,000. The court can order a body corporate to pay up to $10,000,000, or three 
times the value of any commercial gain resulting from the breach, or 10% of their 
turnover if the court cannot readily ascertain the commercial gain.
24 In determining 
the amount of the penalty, the court must take into account whether it has granted any 
exemplary damages and, if the penalty is for a body corporate, any commercial gain 
the company may have obtained through the breach.
25 
If the High Court determines that an individual has violated the prohibition against 
business acquisitions that substantially lessen competition, it may impose a pecuniary 
penalty of, again, up to $500,000. In relation to a body corporate, the penalty is lower 
than for restrictive trade practices: up to $5,000,000.
26 In setting the penalty, the court 
must look at the kind of act the person has committed, the damage anyone has 
suffered, the surrounding circumstances and whether the person has engaged in 
similar conduct before.
27 Important, however, is the fact that the court cannot order a 
person to pay a pecuniary penalty under both the section relating to restrictive trade 
24 Commerce Act 1986, ss 80(1), 80(2), 80(2B)(b) & 80(3). 
25 Commerce Act 1986, s 80(2A). 
26 Commerce Act 1986, ss 83(1), 83(3). 
27 Commerce Act 1986, s 83(2). 
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practices and the section relating to business acquisitions if the same conduct is in 
question. 28 
In 2001, Parliament inserted another pecuniary penalty provision into the NZCA. This 
states that if the court finds that a body corporate has indemnified a director, servant 
or agent of the body corporate, the court can order them to pay a pecuniary penalty of 
up to two times the value of the indemnity.
29 In addition, in 2002, Parliament inserted 
a provision that enables the High Court to order a person to pay a pecuniary penalty of 
up to $500,000 if that person breaches a cease and desist order.
3° Finally, under all 
four of these pecuniary penalty sections, the burden of proof is the civil standard of 
the balance of probabilities.31 
The New Zealand case law on pecuniary penalties under the NZCA is well developed. 
The courts, however, have stated that they will not generally compare the facts of 
previous cases to determine an appropriate penalty. Instead, the courts have used 
previous cases to extract general principles that are applicable to the discussion of 
pecuniary penalties for both corporations and individuals.
32 For example, in relation 
to the NZCA's pecuniary penalties, the courts have made it clear that both general and 
specific deterrence is the most important objective.
33 The court must still, however, 
set the appropriate pecuniary penalty by looking at the individual facts and 
circumstances of each case.34 
28 Commerce Act 1986, s 83(6). 
29 Commerce Act 1986, ss 80A, 80B. 
3° Commerce Act 1986, s 74D. This paper will not consider these pecuniary penalties in detail due to 
space constraints and the fact that there is little discussion on them since Parliament inserted them with 
the Commerce Amendment Act 200 l and their application seems straightforward. 
31 Commerce Act 1986, ss 80(3), 80(B)(3), 83(3). 
32 Commerce Commission v. Gilt rap City Ltd (Penalty) (2002) 10 TCLR 305, 308 (HC). "Penalties for 
Individuals", above n 23, 339. 
33 Giltrap, above n 32, 313; Commerce Commissio11 v. Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Group 
Ltd (Penalty) (2000) 9 TCLR 636, 646 (HC); Commerce Commission v. Caltex New Zeala11d Ltd 
(Penalty) (2000) 9 TCLR 366,369,372 (HC). 
34 Commerce Commission v. Eli Lilly and Co (New Zealand) Ltd (30 April 1999) unreported, High 
Court, Auckland Registry, CL 19/98, 3. 
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The court continues this analysis by first discussing the matters they must consider in 
determining the amount of the pecuniary penalty under sections 80(2A) and 83(2).
35 
The New Zealand courts, however, will also consider the factors outlined in the 
Australian decision of TPC v. Annand & Spencer Pty Ltd.36 These factors are: 
(a) whether the conduct was deliberate; 
(b) whether damage was caused by the conduct to the public or to the retailer; 
(c) the size of the corporation's activity in the relevant market; 
(d) the degree to which the conduct was initiated or condoned by semor 
management; 
(e) what steps were taken by the employer to educate its employees prior to the 
contravention; 
(f) the existence or otherwise of a policy by the corporation against breaches 
of the provisions of the Act; 
(g) whether the conduct was the result of a mistake on the part of the 
employee; 
(h) whether there has been similar conduct in the past; 
(i) whether, since the occurrence, controls over employees, particularly sales 
personnel, have been increased or improved to prevent a repetition of the 
conduct; 
U) whether the corporation has made a full and frank disclosure and co-
operated with the Commission. 
Certain New Zealand decisions have added further relevant factors to this list, but 
several have quite a degree of overlap with those already mentioned. Some of the 
more original are: 
(a) Whether the Commission has settled the case with other defendants; 
(b) Whether the corporation has suffered adverse publicity; 
(c) The need to deter large corporations with larger penalties; 
35 See: Giltrap, above n 32, 307. 
36 TPC v. Annand & Spencer Pty Ltd (1987) 8 ATPR 40-772, 48,394. The New Zealand courts have 
adopted this case in numerous decisions. For example: Carter Holt , above n 33, 646; Caltex, above n 
33, 368-369. 
(d) If it is a minor breach, whether the penalty needs to be hefty to send a 
signal of disapproval; 
(e) Whether the corporation has made certain concessions; and 
(f) Whether it was easy to detect the breach.37 
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Despite the fact that the list seems relatively complete, the courts retain some 
discretion by asserting that the criteria are still open and flexible. In addition, the court 
is fully aware that it must adapt the pecuniary penalty to suit the facts of each case.38 
In relation to the pecuniary penalties for restrictive trade practices and business 
acquisitions for corporations, two main issues arise from the above discussion. First, 
the courts decided all the cases that discussed the above factors before the Commerce 
Amendment Act 2001 came into force. One effect of the Commerce Amendment Act 
2001 was to repeal section 80(2), which used to be identical to section 83(2), and 
directed the court to consider factors that looked at the nature of the conduct and any 
past offending. Consequently, an issue is whether the court will still consider all the 
factors mentioned above, given that it must now, under the NZCA, only have regard 
to whether it granted any exemplary damages, and the nature and extent of any 
commercial gain.39 The way the court assesses the pecuniary penalties for a breach of 
the NZCA's provisions on restrictive trade practices, therefore, may differ from its 
approach in relation to business acquisitions. Mallon and Stevens argue that the court 
will still observe these factors, but that it may focus more upon the nature of the 
commercial gain, the size of the infringing company and whether the company co-
operated with the Commission.40 This is the correct approach but, more specifically, 
the court should simply consider the previous section 80(2) factors with the other 
factors case law has developed, while giving the issues of exemplary damages and 
37 Giltrap, above n 32, 308; Caltex, above n 33, 369; Carter Holt, above n 33, 464. For some additional 
factors that do not seem to be as relevant in the recent cases see: Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 18. 
38 Commerce Commission v. Herberts Bakery Ltd (1991] 2 NZLR 726, 729. 
39 Commerce Act 1986, s 80(2A); Commerce Amendment Act 2001, s 17(2); "Penalties for Corporate 
Offenders", above n 23, 389. 
40 "Penalties for Corporate Offenders", above n 23, 389. Importantly, however, is the fact that it does 
not seem that Mallon and Stevens are attributing any possible increased significance of the co-
operation concept to the changes in the Commerce Amendment Act 2001. 
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commercial gam more prominence. If, therefore, the court does approach its 
consideration of pecuniary penalties relating to restrictive trade practices differently 
from that of business acquisitions, it will only differ in the factors that it emphasises; 
the factors themselves, however, will remain the same. 
The second main issue relates to the size of the pecuniary penalties in sections 80 and 
83. The Commerce Amendment Act 2001 changed the maximum penalty for a body 
corporate that breaches the NZCA's provisions relating to restrictive trade practices.41 
Previously, as with section 83, the maximum penalty was $5,000,000.42 In my 
opinion, the reason that Parliament left the pecuniary penalty relating to business 
acquisitions at $5,000,000 was simply that courts have not made any penalty orders 
under this section. There was, therefore, little need to increase the maximum penalty. 
The more important question is why Parliament decided to increase the penalties 
under section 80. The main reason was a perception that the court was setting the 
penalties at too low a level to fulfil the deterrence objective.43 For example, before 
1998, the highest individual penalty was only six percent of the maximum $5,000,000 
amount.44 In addition, after analysing the decisions, the Ministry of Commerce 
concluded that "the High Court has consistently set penalties at levels that are 
unlikely to achieve deterrence."45 After 1998, however, the courts seemed to increase 
the penalty awards under this provision. For example, in Commerce Commission v. 
Taylor Preston Ltd,46 the court set the highest single pecuniary penalty to date of 
$1,500,000. Subsequent cases appear to be continuing this trend.47 The question 
41 Commerce Amendment Act 2001, ss 17(1), 17(2). 
42 Commerce Act 1986, s 80(1) (repealed). This paper mentions the current penalties at page 7 above. 
43 Peter Allport "Competition Law "An Evolution"" [1998] NZLJ 275. 
44 Allport, above n 43,275; Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 19, 54. 
45 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 31. 
46 Commerce Commission v. Taylor Preston Ltd (No 2) (1998) 6 NZBLC 102,598 (HC). 
47 See: Carter Holt, above n 33, 649 ($525,000); Caltex, above n 33, 373 ($450,000, $350,000 and 
$375,000); Eli Lilly, above n 34, 5 ($500,000 and $200,000). 
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remains, however, as to whether these increased pecuniary penalties were achieving 
deterrence since, if they were, then there was no need for the amendments. 
The most recent case decided by the High Court under the repealed section 80(2) is 
Commerce Commission v. Giltrap City.48 This case considered many of the factors 
relevant to pecuniary penalties mentioned above, and it is therefore useful in 
illustrating whether the penalties were sufficient to achieve deterrence. The High 
Court decided that the nature, extent and circumstances of the breach did not warrant 
a small penalty, 49 although it did find that there was little loss or damage and that the 
defendant had no history of NZCA breaches.so In relation to the factors not mentioned 
in the NZCA, the High Court found that the conduct of the defendant was deliberate 
and performed by senior management. In addition, the company had a high standing, 
was large, and had more extensive financial resources than other like businesses. 
Finally, the defendant had little in the way of compliance programs and they only co-
operated with the Commission as much as was required by law. Despite this, the High 
Court accepted that the defendant had suffered some adverse publicity. The main 
mitigating factor, however, was the fact that the Commission conceded that it was 
constrained in the size of the penalty it could seek, as it had set penalties for other 
defendants in the same case.s 1 
Many of the factors, therefore, were in favour of a large penalty and the Commission 
also believed this as it was seeking a penalty that was five times larger than it had set 
for the other defendants. In the end, the court granted a pecuniary penalty of 
$150,000, which was $100,000 less than the Commission wanted.s
2 In my opinion, 
this decision indicates that the courts were still conservative in granting pecuniary 
48 Giltrap, above n 32, 305. 
49 Giltrap, above n 32, 308-312. One could previously find these factors in the Commerce Act 1986, ss 
80(2)(a) and (c). 
50 Giltrap, above n 32, 312-13. The Commerce Act 1986, ss 80(2)(b) and (d) used to contain these 
factors. 
51 Giltrap, above n 32, 313-319. 
52 Giltrap, above n 32,306, 319. 
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penalties, even for relatively serious anti-competitive conduct. Parliament, therefore, 
had to make a change in order to fulfil the deterrence objective. 
As previously stated, Parliament increased the maximum penalties under section 
80(2B) to better deter offenders. The next issue, therefore, is whether this increase 
will result in higher awards by the courts. The Ministry of Commerce stated that, from 
the cases, it seemed that the courts would increase they size of the penalties if 
Parliament decided to increase the maximum limit.s3 In addition, the government has 
admitted it is hopeful that the increase will result in the courts doubling the level of 
penalties they impose,s4 but there is also an argument that the courts will simply 
interpret the amendments as a tool giving them more flexibility in their penalty 
awards.ss Nevertheless, given the clear message from Parliament and the Ministry of 
Commerce, it would seem that the courts will increase the size of the awards. Finally, 
however, Peter Allport argues that "while increasing statutory maxima may give 
Courts a mandate for heavier sentences, the Commission believes that further steps 
must be taken to raise the level of penalties imposed consistently, to deterrent 
levels."s6 This paper will now discuss the further steps Parliament has taken. 
In 1998, the Ministry of Commerce stated that Parliament should consider whether 
the court should be able to set the maximum penalties based on the turnover of the 
body corporate or the commercial gain from the competition law breach.s7 As 
previously stated, Parliament did implement these changes in section 17(2) of the 
Commerce Amendment Act 2001. In relation to the new NZCA provision on the 
turnover of the body corporate, clearly this will have the result of dramatically 
53 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 20. 
54 "Penalties for Corporate Offenders", above n 23, 390. 
55 "Penalties for Corporate Offenders", above n 23, 390. Gallen J has stated that "to some extent the 
size of the maximum penalty is designed to allow flexibility to cover the wide variation which will 
occur in individual cases" (Commerce Commission v. BP Oil [1992] 1 NZLR 377,381). 
56 Allport, above n 43, 275. 
57 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 15. Section 2 of the NZCA defines turnover as: 
the total gross revenues (exclusive of any tax required to be collected) received or receivable by a body 
corporate in an accounting period as a result of trading by that body corporate within New Zealand. 
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increasing the maximum penalty available to the court.58 This change has the potential 
to allow the court to better deter offenders under the NZCA, but whether the higher 
penalties actually achieve deterrence will depend on how the court uses this power.59 
Currently in New Zealand, the amount of the corporation's turnover has not 
influenced the size of the penalty, and this must change if this amendment is to have 
any effect in deterring competition law breaches. Overseas experience, however, does 
suggest that having the 10% turnover rule will result in the courts imposing larger 
penalties against corporations. 60 
In relation to the court being able to impose a penalty of up to three times the value of 
the commercial gain, the NZCA does not define the term "commercial gain", nor does 
it provide any guidance as to how the court should go about determining what the 
commercial gain is in the cases before it. 61 This concept, however, is crucial, since the 
courts can only consider the provision relating to turnover if they cannot readily 
ascertain the commercial gain. Nevertheless, this provision will still allow the courts 
to increase the maximum penalty in appropriate cases. 
There is one main issue relating to pecuniary penalties for individuals who breach the 
NZCA's provisions against restrictive trade practices and business acquisitions; this 
again arises from the Commerce Amendment Act 2001 and a comparison between 
sections 80 and 83 . Both sections have a maximum penalty of $500,000, but section 
80(2) creates a presumption that the court must order an individual to pay a pecuniary 
penalty unless there is a good reason for not doing so.62 The Commerce Amendment 
Act 2001 created this presumption and the reason for this was a concern that the 
courts were very rarely imposing pecuniary penalties upon individuals. Indeed, the 
58 "Penalties for Corporate Offenders", above n 23,391. 
59 Mallon and Stevens outline some views of the European Court of Justice relating to penalties based 
on turnover. Firstly, that one cannot simply base the penalty on turnover and, secondly, that the 10% 
turnover rule was to make sure that the offending corporation could pay the penalty ("Penalties for 
Corporate Offenders", above n 23, 391). 
60 "Penalties for Corporate Offenders", above n 23, 391. 
61 "Penalties for Corporate Offenders", above n 23, 390. 
62 Again, no cases have imposed a pecuniary penalty on an individual under section 83. The following 
discussion, therefore, focuses on section 80. 
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courts have required a pecuniary penalty from an individual under the NZCA on only 
three occasions, and the highest was $10,000.63 Clearly, therefore, the previous 
section 80(2) was not sufficiently deterring individuals from breaching the NZCA. 
The amendment attempts to achieve deterrence by indicating to the court that it must 
impose penalties on individuals more often and by informing the individuals that the 
courts are more likely to penalise them personally for the breach. 
Mallon and Stevens identify four reasons that the courts may classify as "good" under 
section 80(2): 
(a) the offending was not deliberate; 
(b) the individual took and followed legal advice before acting; 
(c) the individual played only a minor role in prohibited conduct; 
(d) the offending did not involve a breach of section 30.64 
In my opinion, the court might agree that the first three of Mallon and Stevens' 
possible "good" reasons do justify them not imposing a penalty upon an individual. 
The fact that the offending did not involve a price fixing contract under section 30, 
however, should not be a good reason. If the court did decide this was a good reason, 
this could limit the effect of section 80(2), as it would be clearly contrary to the broad 
wording of that provision. If Parliament intended this to be a purpose of section 80(2), 
it would undoubtedly have mentioned this in the amendments. Nevertheless, what will 
be a "good" reason will depend upon how the court interprets and applies this section, 
but it should not be used as a means to continue the trend of infrequent penalties 
having little deterrent effect. 
63 "Penalties for Individuals", above n 23, 339; Miriam R Dean, Dr Lindsay Hampton and Douglas 
White The Laws of New Zealand: Competition Law (Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) para 255. These 
cases were Commerce Commission v. BP Oil New Zealand Ltd [1992) 1 NZLR 377 ($8,000); 
Commerce Commission v. Wrightson NMA Ltd (1994) 6 TCLR 279 ($10,000 and $5,000); Commerce 
Commission v. Christchurch Transport Ltd (21 August 1998) unreported, High Court, Christchurch 
Registry, CP 72/98 ($10,000). 
64 "Penalties for Individuals", above n 23, 340. 
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2 Damages 
If someone suffers damage that is caused by another person engaging in conduct that 
violates the NZCA's prohibitions on restrictive trade practices, or its prohibitions on 
certain business acquisitions, they may bring an action against that person for 
damages.65 In addition, if a person has violated the NZCA's prohibitions on restrictive 
trade practices, the court may also require them to pay exemplary damages. The court 
retains this discretion even if it has ordered that person to pay a pecuniary penalty for 
the same conduct under section 80, although such an order will influence the amount 
of exemplary damages, if any, that the court grants.66 
The principles surrounding general damages in New Zealand are well established. 
First, the court should grant a plaintiff an amount of money in damages that will place 
the plaintiff in the same position that they would have been in if the defendant had not 
committed the wrong.67 Secondly, certain factors may reduce the amount of damages 
that the court will grant, such as contributory negligence, mitigation of loss and the 
remoteness of the damage.68 When actually calculating the amount of damages, the 
court must remember four main principles. These are: (1) that it must award damages 
as a lump sum; (2) it must be able to measure the damages in money; (3) the plaintiff 
must have mitigated their loss; and (4) the plaintiff being entitled to insurance is 
irrelevant.69 
65 Commerce Act 1986, ss 82 & 84A. More specifically, the court will find the person liable if they 
engage in conduct that constitutes: 
(a) A contravention of any of the provisions of [Part 2 and section 47] of this Act: 
(b) Aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the contravention of such a provision: 
(c) Inducing by threats, promises, or otherwise the contravention of such a provision: 
(d) Being in any way directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the 
contravention of such a provision: 
(e) Conspiring with any other person in the contravention of such a provision. 
66 Commerce Act 1986, s 82A. 
67 Livingstone v. Raywards Coal Co (1880) 5 AC 25, 39. 
68 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 33. 
69 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 35. 
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In New Zealand, the courts have awarded a plaintiff compensatory damages only once 
under the NZCA,70 although plaintiffs on several occasions have unsuccessfully 
claimed compensatory damages. For example, in Union Shipping v. Port Nelson, the 
plaintiffs sought damages, but the court stated that there was not a sufficient 
connection between the illegal act and the plaintiff's loss.71 Overall, the courts have 
greatly underused their powers relating to compensatory damages. 
The next issue concerns the role of compensatory damages under the NZCA. As 
previously stated, the main aim is to compensate the victim. There is an argument, 
however, that deterrence should be an aim of damages under the NZCA. This 
argument claims that the courts should view damages as "the public enforcement 
equivalent of pecuniary penalties."72 In my opinion, however, exemplary damages are 
better suited to fulfilling the deterrence objective. It seems that Parliament is also of 
this view, as in 2001 it explicitly gave the courts the power to force an offender to pay 
exemplary damages.73 The aim of exemplary damages in general , and seemingly 
under the NZCA, is to fulfil the retributive objective of punishment.74 Furthermore, 
New Zealand courts have recognised that another legitimate purpose of exemplary 
damages is to deter offenders from future breaches.75 
There are also some general principles surrounding exemplary damages that will be 
relevant to their role under the NZCA. First, the plaintiff must have been the victim of 
behaviour that justifies punishment. Secondly, the award should be moderate, and 
finally, the court should consider the parties ' resources.76 The Ministry of Commerce 
70 "Penalties for Individuals", above n 23, 341. This was a case between Clear and Telecom. 
71 Union Shipping New Zealand Ltd v. Port Nelson Ltd (1990) 3 NZBLC 101 , 618 (HC). 
72 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 32. 
73 Commerce Amendment Act 2001, s 20. Also, see the di scussion above. 
74 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 33. 
75 Cook v. Evatt [1992] l NZLR 676 (HC). 
76 Rookes v. Barnard [1964] AC 1129, 1227-1228 . 
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has also stated that the amount of general damages awarded and the conduct of each 
of the offenders is relevant to the size of the exemplary damages award.77 
It is uncertain, however, whether the exemplary damages prov1s1on will have any 
impact on competition law generally, or more specifically, the objective of deterrence. 
The reason is that the courts already under-utilise their powers relating to 
compensatory damages, and so it is unlikely that they will use the exemplary damages 
section anytime soon. In addition, even if the plaintiff did satisfy the court that the 
conduct in question was so outrageous that it justified granting exemplary damages, 
the amount of the award is likely to be relatively small. This is because the size of 
exemplary damage awards in other fields of law has been modest and the size of 
awards under the NZCA has also been low.78 This trend, therefore, is likely to 
continue in relation to exemplary damages. 
3 Injunctions and Other Orders 79 
The Commerce Commission or a private party may apply to the court for an 
injunction preventing a person from engaging in a wide range of anti-competitive 
conduct. First, the court may grant injunctions to prevent a person from breaching the 
NZCA' s provisions relating to restrictive trade practices and those relating to business 
acquisitions. 80 In relation to potential breaches of the provisions on business 
77 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 34. 
78 "Penalties for Individuals", above n 23, 341-342. Mallon and Stevens also state that it is unlikely that 
a court would grant exemplary damages against an individual offender. 
79 In my opinion, it is best to consider these two penalty provisions together, as there is a great degree 
of overlap between the two. In addition, the Ministry of Commerce treats these two penalty provisions 
in this manner (Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 39-46). 
8° Commerce Act 1986, ss 81 & 84. More specifically these sections state that the court may grant an 
injunction if the conduct would constitute: 
(a) A contravention of any of the provisions of [Part 2 or section 47] of this Act: 
(b) Any attempt to contravene such a provision: 
(c) Aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring any other person to contravene such a provision: 
(d) Inducing, or attempting to induce, any other person, whether by threats, promises or 
otherwise, to contravene such a provision: 
(e) Being in any way directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the 
contravention by any other person of such a provision: 
(f) Conspiring with any other person to contravene such a provision. 
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acquisitions, the court may require any person to meet certain obligations relating to 
the conduct of the business or the safeguarding of the business or its assets.
81 Under 
section 87, the court may also grant an injunction to restrain someone from supplying 
goods or services in breach of section 55. In addition, under this section the court may 
require any person to supply those goods or services in accordance with any 
authorisation, provisional authorisation or undertaking made under sections 70, 71 
and 72 respectively. 82 In relation to all the sections mentioned above, however, the 
applicant for the injunction must satisfy the court that the person has engaged, or is 
likely to engage, in anti-competitive behaviour.83 
If a person engages in conduct that breaches the NZCA's prohibitions on restrictive 
trade practices, and this has caused, or is likely to cause, someone loss or damage, the 
court may also make any order against that person that it thinks appropriate. 
84 In 
addition, if someone enters a contract or a covenant that would contravene any part of 
the NZCA, the court may vary or cancel the contract or vary the covenant. The court 
may also require any person who would benefit from the covenant or who is party to 
the contract to pay the other party restitution or compensation.85 
Under the NZCA, the courts have the power to grant permanent injunctions, interim 
injunctions and mandatory orders.86 Permanent injunctions are just that, and stop a 
person from committing conduct that breaches the NZCA. Interim injunctions aim to 
temporarily restrain the defendant from doing something that will cause people 
damage for which they cannot be compensated at the full hearing. Finally, mandatory 
injunctions can be either permanent or interim, and force the defendant to do 
81 Commerce Act 1986, ss 84(b) & 84(c). 
82 Commerce Act 1986, s 87. 
83 Commerce Act 1986, ss 88(2) & 88(3). The court can also grant interim injunctions to restrain these 
kinds of conduct but, under section 88(3A), they must "give any weight that the Court considers 
appropriate to the interests of consumers or, as the case may be, acquirers." 
84 Commerce Act 1986, s 89(1). The court may also make an order against someone who did any act 
that is mentioned in section 8l(b) to (f) of the NZCA (see: Commerce Act 1986, s 8l(b)-(f), above n 
36. 
85 Commerce Act 1986, ss 89(2) & 89(3). 
86 Commerce Act 1986, ss 84, 87, 88 and 89 ( discussed below). 
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something to prevent damage to others.87 Most of the discussion, both judicial and 
academic, has been on interim injunctions, and that is the focus of this paper. First, 
however, this paper looks briefly at permanent and mandatory injunctions. 
In addition to the NZCA's requirements mentioned above, the court will only grant 
the plaintiff a permanent injunction if damages would not be an adequate remedy.88 In 
relation to competition law, however, there is no further discussion than this. 
Mandatory injunctions have been more relevant to competition law, but in the courts, 
plaintiffs seeking them as a remedy have been unsuccessful. The reason for this is that 
the courts do not want to continually monitor whether the parties adhere to the terms 
of the mandatory injunction. In addition, the idea that in the future the court may 
encounter a case involving similar conduct bothers the courts; more specifically, they 
do not want to feel bound to grant mandatory injunctions in like cases. Overall, it 
seems that the court will only grant mandatory injunctions when this is the only 
means to deal with a serious breach of the NZCA.89 
There are six factors the court considers in deciding whether to grant an interim 
injunction under competition law. These are (1) whether the plaintiff has established a 
prima facie case; (2) the balance of convenience; (3) the adequacy of damages as a 
remedy; (4) the strength of the parties' cases; (5) discretionary factors; and (6) overall 
justice.90 The main question, however, is whether the plaintiff has "shown that the risk 
of injustice to an ultimately successful, but temporarily unassisted, plaintiff is greater 
than the risk of injustice to a temporarily restrained, but ultimately successful, 
defendant."91 
87 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 42. 
88 John Burrows and Ursula Cheer Media Law in New Zealand (4 ed, Oxford University Press, 
Auckland, 1999) 2. 
89 See: Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 45-46. 
90 Telecom New Zealand Ltd v. Clear Communications Ltd (18 July 1997) unreported, High Court, 
Auckland Registry, CL 20/97, 17; Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 39. The courts, however, will 
only consider factors 4 and 5 in appropriate cases. 
91 Telecom v. Clear, above n 90, 17. 
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Under competition law, however, the courts must also give weight to the public 
interest when considering whether to grant an interim injunction.92 The reason for this 
is that, if the defendant's conduct is anti-competitive, society as a whole is likely to 
suffer damage. For example, this damage may result from higher prices or general 
market inefficiencies. When the court finally decides at a full hearing, however, that 
the conduct is anti-competitive it will be too late for most of those who suffered 
damage to receive any compensation. The court, therefore, must consider this at the 
interim injunction stage.93 
Before section 88(3A) of the NZCA made it a clear requirement for the courts to 
consider the interests of consumers when granting interim injunctions, the cases had 
already established that public interest was an important factor. For example, in 
Direct Holdings v. Feltex the High Court indicated that the protection of consumers 
was an important objective.94 The court in subsequent cases, however, has rarely 
granted interim injunctions and the Ministry of Commerce suggests four reasons for 
this. These are: (1) overlooking the relevance of consumer interest to public interest; 
(2) confusion between "the consumer" and "consumers"; (3) protecting rights of 
essential facilities owners and; (4) optimism about how long it takes a case to reach 
full hearing.95 
Section 88(3A) of the NZCA, however, may remove some of these reasons and 
thereby make the courts more likely to use interim injunctions. Namely, the courts 
now surely will not overlook the relevance of consumer interest given the clear 
wording of the section. In addition, the section states "the interests of consumers" and 
consequently the courts clearly must now consider the interests of all consumers 
effected by the conduct. Conversely, however, section 88(3A) does not deal with the 
Ministry of Commerce's claim that the courts have a desire to protect the rights of 
essential facilities owners. Furthermore, the section will not effect the fact that the 
92 Commerce Act 1986, s 88(3A) inserted by the Commerce Amendment Act 2001, s 22. 
93 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 40. 
94 Direct Holdings v. Feltex (1986) 2 TCLR 61 (HC). The case of Bond & Bond v. Fisher & Paykel 
(1986) 2 TCLR 79 (HC) affirmed this approach. 
95 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 43-44. 
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courts have been optimistic about how long it takes a competition law case to reach 
full hearing. Only the courts themselves can deal with these impediments to the 
granting of interim injunctions by changing their mindset. Overall, however, section 
88(3A) does have the potential to make the courts more likely to grant interim 
injunctions in competition law cases. 
The final issue relevant to interim injunctions, and injunctions generally, is the fact 
that the courts should also have regard to the role injunctions can play in deterring 
competition law offences. Namely, if an offender knows that the courts readily grant 
injunctions (whether standard, interim or mandatory), then the offender may be less 
likely to engage in the conduct.96 The reality, however, is that the court has not 
established or mentioned any relationship between its granting of injunctions and the 
role this penalty can play in deterring competition law offences.97 As previously 
stated, deterrence is a valid aim of injunctions and, by not establishing this link, the 
courts have not fully comprehended this penalty's role under competition law. 
4 Fines 
Section 55 states that no person can supply controlled goods or services unless the 
Commerce Commission has authorised the supply, or unless the person has given the 
Commission an undertaking consistent with Part V of the NZCA. In addition, the 
person supplying the goods or services must do so in accordance with either the 
authorisation or undertaking.98 If a person breaches this section, and they are not a 
body corporate, they are liable on summary conviction to a fine of up to $50,000. If 
they are a body corporate, the maximum fine is $500,000. In addition, the court may 
order the offender to pay to the defendant an amount not exceeding the difference 
between the price that the offender did charge and that which they should have 
charged.99 
96 See: Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 41. 
97 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 45. 
98 Commerce Act 1986, s 55 . 
99 Commerce Act 1986, ss 86(1 ), 86(2). 
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The courts and academics have not yet directly considered either the application of 
this section or any issues that it raises. The main reason is that this section is relatively 
uncomplicated, although it does raise two minor issues. First, it is unclear whether the 
court can only order the defendant to pay the difference between what they should 
have charged and what they did charge for a single good or service. For example, if 
bread was a controlled good and the defendant supplied 10,000 loaves at ten cents 
over the set price, it is unclear what the penalty would be. Common sense, however, 
would indicate that the defendant would have to pay $1,000 as opposed to 10 cents. 
Secondly, the court has the discretion to, instead of simply accepting the fine as 
outlined in the Summary Proceedings Act 1957, make the fine payable to someone 
that has suffered loss due to the defendants breach of section 55. 100 This is an 
important addition to the power of the court, as it shows that Parliament wanted this 
penalty to fulfil a reparative objective as well as those of deterrence and retribution. In 
relation to these objectives, the lack of case law and literature on this penalty makes it 
impossible to decide whether section 86 is adequately satisfying these aims. The lack 
of section 86 fines, however, does indicate that offenders breaching section 55 is not 
that bigger a problem under New Zealand competition law. 
5 Divestiture of Assets or Shares 
If the court decides, or has previously decided, that a person has breached the 
prohibitions on business acquisitions that substantially lessen competition, they may 
make an order that that person dispose of any assets or shares. The person must 
dispose of these assets or shares in accordance with either a court order or that 
person's undertaking. 101 
100 Commerce Act 1986, s 86(4). 
101 Commerce Act 1986, s 85(1). The person must make the undertaking under section 69A of the 
NZCA. 
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The only New Zealand case that has considered the divestiture of assets and shares in 
any detail was Commerce Commission v. Fletcher Challenge.
102 One can extract some 
certain general principles from this case. First, although this penalty is discretionary, 
the court must have a jurisdictional foundation before exercising this discretion. 
Namely, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant breached section 47 of the NZCA. 
Secondly, the plaintiff can only seek divestment of an acquisition if that acquisition 
occurred through a breach of section 47. Related to this is the Australian case of 
Trade Practices Commission v. Australia Meat Holdings. 
103 This case stated that a 
company could undertake to divest assets not part of the acquisition that was in 
breach, as long as divesting the assets resulted in the defendant losing their prohibited 
market dominance. This seems like a sensible approach and, in my opinion, if the 
issue arose in New Zealand the courts would take a similar view. The Australian 
courts have made similar sounding comments about divestment in general. For 
example, the Australian courts have regard to the public interest and aims at restoring 
the competitive environment that existed before the prohibited business acquisition.
104 
The Australian Federal Court further developed the ideas of public interest and the 
desire not to overly harm the defendant when they stated that: 
It is better to mould the order to the necessities of the case, going only so far as 
to remove from the control of the acquirer those assets that contribute to its 
market dominance. There is no public interest in forcing the divestiture of those 
that do not. 105 
Again, in my opinion, the Australian courts have approached the issue in a reasonable 
and simple manner, while still emphasising the crucial factor of public interest. The 
102 Commerce Commission v. Fletcher Challenge Ltd (23 August 1999) unreported, High Court, 
Auckland Registry, CL 46/97. Affirmed on appeal in Commerce Commission v. Fletcher Challenge Ltd 
[2000) 3 NZLR 670 (CA). 
103 Trade Practices Commission v. Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) (1988) ATPR 49,462 
(HCA). 
104 Trade Practices Commission v. Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) ATPR 49,465, 49517 
(FCA). 
105 Australia Meat Holdings, above n 104, 49,517; Dean, Hampton and White, above n 63, para 260. 
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New Zealand courts would do well to adopt a similar approach to Australia should the 
. . 
issue anse. 
The final principle that one can extract from Commerce Commission v. Fletcher 
Challenge is the fact that section 85 does not apply to persons that are merely parties 
to the section 47 breach. Namely, the courts may only subject the principal offenders 
to a divestiture of assets or shares order. The court gave four reasons for this: (1) the 
court should not take away more property rights than necessary; (2) the court 
interprets penal provisions strictly; (3) there are already adequate penalties for parties; 
and (4) other penalties specifically state that parties are included, whereas section 47 
does not. 106 In my opinion, the court has approached this issue correctly. It would be 
absurd for the court to order a party to divest their assets or shares when they were not 
directly involved in the prohibited business acquisition. Moreover, as the court stated, 
there are already enough penalties in the NZCA for the courts to utilise if the party 
has committed a wrong. 
Overall, the main problem with assessing the effectiveness of this penalty is the lack 
of judicial and academic comment in New Zealand. The penalty itself, however, is 
developing well. 
6 Cease and Desist Orders 
The cease and desist order is a recent and very important part of the NZCA's 
enforcement provisions. 107 The importance lies in the fact that the Commerce 
Commissioner may make an order restraining perceived anti-competitive conduct for 
any period and on any terms. 108 A cease and desist order may also require a person to 
do something, but only if restraining the person from the conduct will not by itself 
restore competition. 109 There are certain safeguards on this enforcement power, such 
106 Fletcher Challenge (HC), above n 102, 12, 13, 15, 16. 
107 Commerce Act 1986, s 74A as inserted by the Commerce Amendment Act 2001, s 15. 
108 Commerce Act 1986, s 74A(2). The Commissioner, however, must specify the period and terms in 
the order. 
109 Commerce Act 1986, s 74A(3)(a). 
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as the Commissioner having to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case that the 
person's conduct will justify a pecuniary penalty. In addition, the Commissioner must 
be satisfied that urgent action is in the public interest and is necessary to prevent a 
person, or consumers, from suffering serious loss or damage. 110 As previously 
mentioned, if a person fails to comply with a cease and desist order, the court may 
order that person to pay a pecuniary penalty of up to $500,000. 111 
Parliament inserted this penalty provision into the NZCA in 2001, and it is important 
because it extends the Commissioner's enforcement powers under the NZCA. 112 
There, however, has been no judicial or academic writing on cease and desist orders 
in New Zealand, but one can still make some general comments. First, it is a power of 
the Commissioner, not the courts and, at first, it does seem to be a very wide 
discretionary power. As mentioned above, however, section 74 does limit the 
Commissioner's powers. In my opinion, a good way to understand this power is to see 
it as a power of injunction that the Commissioner can, in certain circumstances, 
enforce quickly without having to apply to the court. In addition, one can interpret the 
cease and desist order as providing the Commissioner with the powers of general , 
mandatory, permanent and interim injunctions. 
Overall, this penalty has the potential to be hugely relevant to competition law and, if 
used well , it may provide an effective deterrent to anti-competitive behaviour. The 
main reason for its effectiveness will be the fact that the Commissioner can 
implement it relatively quickly. In addition, the cease and desist order may be able to 
stop serious harm to people and consumers before it is too late for them to obtain an 
adequate remedy. We must wait for specific cases, however, to see whether the cease 
and desist order will reach its full potential. 
11° Commerce Act 1986, ss 74A(l )(a) and 74A(l)(b). There are also more safeguards in section 74B, 
which relate to investigation into the conduct, recommendations, the serving of notices and the 
opportunity to be heard. Section 74C also provides some procedural safeguards. 
111 Commerce Act 1986, s 74D. 
112 Commerce Amendment Act 2001 , s 15. 
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Overall, these are the main penalties in the NZCA and, although none are of a 
criminal nature, their scope and application is still reasonably extensive. 113 
III COMPETITION LAW PENALTIES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
This part of this paper introduces and discusses the competition law penalties of the 
United Kingdom and Canada. 
A United Kingdom 
The UK.CA is a relatively recent piece of legislation, which the United Kingdom 
Parliament introduced "after years of concern that U.K policy was in need of 
reform." 114 The penalty provisions in the UK.CA are relatively simple, but extremely 
broad. 
1 Directions 
If the Director General of Fair Trading ("Director") decides that an agreement violates 
the UKCA's prohibitions relating anti-competitive agreements and concerted 
practices, they may give any directions that they consider appropriate to stop the 
violation. 115 This power also applies if the Director decides that someone's conduct 
breaches the prohibitions relating to the abuse of a dominant position. 116 
In addition, if the Director has not finished their investigation into a possible breach 
of the UK.CA, but they have a reasonable suspicion that someone has committed a 
113 A penalty that this paper has not mentioned is section SOC. This section allows the court to exclude 
a person from the management of a body corporate for up to five years. This section applies if the 
person entered into, or gave effect to (1) an agreement that has the purpose of substantially lessening 
competition in a market or; (2) an exclusionary provision. 
114 David Parker "The Competition Act 1998: Change and Continuity in U.K. Competition Policy" 
(July 2000) JBL 283. 
11 5 Competition Act 1998 (UK), s 32. 
116 Competition Act 1998 (UK), s 33. 
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breach, they may also make directions. These directions, however, must be to prevent 
serious, irreparable damage to a person, or to protect the public interest.
117 
The Director's power to make directions, therefore, is extremely wide and it seems to 
include the ability to make orders such as injunctions and cease and desist orders. One 
fundamental principle, however, governs this power. This is whether, in practice and 
viewed as a whole, the directions would be sufficient to encourage conditions that 
would promote competition in the market. 11 8
 For example, in the leading case of Napp 
v. Director General, the Director was able to make directions that prohibited Napp 
from setting prices without the Director's consent, unless they did so in accordance 
with other certain directions. In addition, the Director also ordered Napp to cease all 
infringements of the UK.CA and to refrain from similar conduct in the future. On 
appeal, the Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal ("CCAT") upheld these 
directions as the Director was acting within their powers and the directions would 
promote competition in the market. 119 
This penalty provision, therefore, seems somewhat similar to the situation under the 
NZCA. The difference, however, lies in the fact that the Director has a wider range of 
powers than the New Zealand Commissioner. There could be benefits in New Zealand 
adopting this approach, as the Commissioner may be able to deal with breaches of the 
NZCA more quickly and efficiently than a court. In addition, so long as the defendant 
had the right to appeal the penalty, as is the case under the UK.CA, the benefits of this 
approach may well outweigh the detriments caused by the possibility of the 
Commissioner occasionally imposing unjustified penalties. 
2 Penalties 
If the Director decides someone has intentionally or negligently breached the 
prohibitions relating to anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices, or the 
11 7 Competition Act 1998 (UK), s 35. 
11 8 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited and Subsidiaries v. Director General of Fair Trading 
(Napp 4) [2002] ECC (CCAT) 13 para 560. 
11 9 Napp, above n 118, paras 553 , 560. 
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prohibitions relating to abuse of a dominant position, they may impose a penalty on 
that person. This penalty can be up to 10% of the party's commercial turnover in the 
United Kingdom, but it is likely that in most cases the penalty will be around the 4-
5% mark. 120 
The first interesting point relating to this penalty is the requirement that someone 
either intentionally or negligently breaches the UK.CA. This is a threshold issue, but 
the Director does not have to decide whether someone has breached the UKCA 
intentionally or negligently if they are satisfied the person comes under one of these 
components. Whether the person has breached the UK.CA intentionally or negligently, 
however, is a factor that can mitigate the size of the penalty. The Director therefore 
may have to decide this when considering the seriousness of the breach. 121 
Another issue relating to intention and negligence is the fact that the CCAT has stated 
that the criminal law principles of mens rea are irrelevant to this penalty. 122 Instead, 
the CCAT has provided its own definitions of intention and negligence. The CCAT 
states that a person will intend the breach if they must have been aware that their 
conduct would restrict or distort competition. In addition, the person does not have to 
know that they were breaching the UK.CA provided they were aware of the anti-
competitive nature of their conduct. This, therefore, is a very low level of intention 
and, assuming the Director deems the anti-competitive effects of the conduct as 
readily foreseeable, they can impute the person with the requisite intention. 123 
Conversely, the CCAT has stated that someone will have negligently breached section 
36 if that person ought to have known that their conduct would restrict or distort 
competition. 124 The difference, therefore, between intention and negligence under 
section 36 is insignificant. The only difference is that a person who actually foresees a 
12° Competition Act 1998 (UK), s 36; Parker, above n 114,289. 
121 Napp, above n 118, paras 453-455. 
122 b Napp, a oven 118, para 458. 
123 Napp, above n 118, para 456. 
124 Napp, above n 118, para 457. 
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anti-competitive consequence will have intended the breach, while someone who fails 
to foresee such a consequence, but should have, will be negligent. 
The next point relating to section 36 is the size of the penalty. Generally the CCAT, 
and hence the Director, will assess what the penalty should be in a broad manner and 
they will have regard to the individual circumstances of each case. 125 Penalties under 
this section, however, must meet certain objectives. First, the size of the penalty must 
reflect the seriousness of the breach, and secondly, the penalty must satisfy the 
objectives of general and specific deterrence. These objectives are why there should 
be large penalties for acts such as price fixing under the UKCA. 126 
In setting the amount of the penalty under the UK.CA, the CCA T and the Director 
must have regard to five relevant principles. Firstly, they must apply a certain 
percentage rate to the turnover relevant to the infringement. This percentage can be as 
high as 10% and hence the penalty can be up to 10% of the relevant turnover, which is 
"the relevant product market and relevant geographic market affected by the 
infringement in the last financial year." 127 Secondly, the CCAT or the Director can 
adjust the penalty in reference to the duration of the breach. For example, they can 
multiply the penalties for infringements continuing more than one year by an amount 
up to the number of years the infringement has lasted. Thirdly, the CCAT or the 
Director can adjust the penalty with reference to other factors they deem relevant. 
This principle allows them to change the penalty to an amount that they believe will 
achieve deterrence. Fourthly, the CCAT and the Director must consider other 
mitigating factors , such as whether the person intended the breach, which may reduce 
the size of the penalty. Finally, the CCAT or the Director must make sure that the 
penalty they have arrived at does not exceed the statutory maximum.128 
As stated previously, New Zealand has now adopted the percentage of turnover as a 
way to assess the size of pecuniary penalties and, unlike the UK.CA, the NZCA does 
125 Napp , above n 118, para 535. 
126 Napp , above n 118, para 474. 
127 Napp, above 118, para 475 . 
128 Napp, above n 118, paras 474-480. 
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not encounter issues of intention and negligence. In my opinion, however, there is one 
attractive option for reform that New Zealand could investigate in reference to the 
NZCA's provisions on pecuniary penalties. Namely, Parliament or the courts should 
formulate a series of principles, similar to the United Kingdom, that better organise all 
the relevant factors they presently consider relating to the size of the pecuniary 
penalty. This, however, is a minor reform option as opposed to one of substance that 
adopts the law of the United Kingdom. In addition, however, New Zealand may want 
to look at giving the Commissioner the power to impose pecuniary penalties, but 
otherwise the law in the United Kingdom is relatively similar. 
3 Damages 
Although there is no express section in the UK.CA, there is an argument that victims 
may have a case in damages where they have suffered loss because of anti-
competitive conduct. During the parliamentary debates concerning the UK.CA, 
Ministers stated that the remedy of damages could be possible under competition law. 
It also seems that the courts will hear the actions for damages and that any decisions 
by the Director or the Tribunal of Fair Trading will be relevant as evidence.129 In 
addition, it is interesting to note that the United Kingdom Parliament is considering 
allowing the CCAT to hear the damage claims of people who are victims of 
competition law breaches under the UKCA. 130 
Overall, there are some differences between competition law penalties in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. Namely, the Director has more powers than the New 
Zealand Commissioner, the United Kingdom Parliament has phrased the penalty 
provisions more broadly and simply and the United Kingdom has some useful general 
guidelines that New Zealand may wish to consider. Nevertheless, as regards the actual 
penalties available for breaches of competition law, there is not a great deal of 
difference between the law of the United Kingdom and that of New Zealand. 
129 Parker, above n 114, 289. 
130 Barry J Rodger "Early Steps to a Mature Competition Law System: Case Law Developments in the 
First 18 Months of the Competition Act 1998" (2002) 23(2) ECLR 52, 67. 
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B Canada 
The CCA as it relates to penalties for breaches of competition law is, in my opinion, 
the most comprehensive and detailed of the three countries under consideration. Some 
of the penalty provisions, however, were somewhat ineffectual until the early-1990s. 
This is especially so in relation to the criminal conspiracy provision in section 45 of 
the CCA which, between 1970 and 1983, the courts only used to convict defendants 
on 29 occasions. 131 Nevertheless, the Canadian courts and legislature have been 
continuously modernising the CCA, with the result being a very extensive and 
efficient piece of legislation. 132 This part introduces and analyses some of the CCA's 
main penalty provisions. 
1 Section 45 
Part VI of the CCA outlines the violations of competition law that are punishable by 
criminal sanctions. Undoubtedly the most significant penalty provision is section 
45. 133 This section provides that anyone who conspires or agrees with another person 
to unduly limit facilities, to unduly prevent or lessen the manufacture of a product or 
the competition relating to this product, to unduly enhance the price of a product or to 
otherwise unduly restrain competition is guilty of an indictable offence. On 
conviction, the court may imprison the offender for up to five years and/or impose a 
fine of up to $10,000,000. 134 
131 Richard Janda and Daniel M Bellemare "Canada's Prohibition Against Anti-Competitive Collusion: 
The New Rapprochement with U.S. Law" (1993) 38 McGill LJ 620,622. 
132 Paul Francois Famula "Section 45 of the Competition Act: Partial Rule of Reason or Partially 
Reasonable Rule" (1999) 62 Sask L Rev 121, 171. Janda and Bellemare, above n 109, 622. 
133 See: Janda and Bellemare, above n 131 ,620; Famula, above n 132, 121. 
134 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 45. This section states that: 
Everyone who conspires, combines, agrees or arranges with another person 
(a) to limit unduly the facilities for transporting, producing, manufacturing, supplying, storing or 
dealing in any product, 
(b) to prevent, limit or lessen, unduly, the manufacture or production of a product or to enhance 
unreasonably the price thereof, 
(c) to prevent or lessen, unduly, competition in the production, manufacture, purchase, barter, 
sale, storage, rental, transportation or supply of a product, or in the price of insurance on 
persons or property, or 
(d) to otherwise restrain or injure competition unduly 
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Clearly, the plaintiff must satisfy many elements under this section before the court 
can exercise its discretion. The first such element is the fact that there must be two or 
more parties who come to a mutual agreement that will breach section 45. 
Consequently, that is why academics and the courts refer to this section as a criminal 
conspiracy provision. 135 Important, however, is the fact that the plaintiff does not have 
to prove that the defendant actually carried this agreement into effect. In addition, the 
courts will not find all agreements that would have the prohibited anti-competitive 
effects criminally blameworthy under this section, as it contains numerous 
exceptions. 136 
An important part of this first element is that the parties to the offence must have done 
the acts "in pursuance of a criminal purpose held in common between them."137 
Generally, academics and the courts refer to this as the requirement that the parties 
have a "meeting of the minds" regarding the carrying out of the prohibited conduct. In 
addition, the plaintiff will have to prove that the defendant fulfilled this requirement 
to the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. 138 Related to this, however, is 
the notion of "conscious parallelism." The Canadian courts have held that people can 
behave in a way that suggests a meeting of the minds when in fact they are merely 
acting in this way due to unilateral, but interdependent, decisions. Namely, people are 
simply promoting their own interests, but it so happens that each person is doing this 
in the same way. The Canadian courts have actually refused to find a person guilty 
based on this theory. 139 
is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to a 
fine not exceeding ten million dollars or to both. 
135 Famula, above 132, 121. 
136 See: Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 45(3)-(8). 
137 R v. Meyrick & Ribujfi (1929) 21 Cr. App R 94, 102 (CCA). 
138 Famula, above n 132, 130. 
139 R v. Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd (1973) 12 CPR (2d) 12 (Ont. PCC Div); R v. Aluminium Co of 
Canada Ltd (1975) 22 CPR (2d) 216 (Que. CSP). 
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Overall, the plaintiff does not have to provide the court with direct evidence proving 
the existence of this meeting of the minds. The plaintiff may actually prove this via 
circumstantial evidence, the reason being, that cases where the plaintiff will actually 
have any direct evidence of this will be very rare. 140 
The second element refers to whether the agreement will have an undue effect on 
competition and three main issues arise. First, the court must define the market. 
Generally, the courts will define the market in reference to the smallest group of 
products, and the smallest geographical area, in which a sole seller could impose a 
profitable price increase. 141 In addition, the courts have to define the market because 
this definition influences whether the conduct has an undue effect on competition. 
Namely, if the court defines the market as wide, this is likely to reduce the 
defendant's market power and lessen the chances that an injury to competition will 
follow. 142 
This, however, gives rise to one main problem with the plaintiff having to illustrate to 
the court the relevant market. This is the fact that the plaintiff must have the correct 
definition, or the court may define the market as broader and the plaintiff's case may 
be harder to prove. The relevant market, however, will constantly be changing and 
consequently the plaintiff may have trouble convincing the court of what they see to 
be the correct definition, especially given the need to prove the relevant market 
beyond reasonable doubt. 143 
The second factor relevant to whether the conduct will have an undue effect on 
competition, is the market power of the defendant. The defendant must have a certain 
degree of market share before they can have any market power. If, however, the 
defendant does have market share, the judicial finding of market power is not 
14° Competition Act 1985 (Canada) s 45(2.l); Famula, above n 132, 131. 
141 Famula, above 132, 139-140. This is the definition relating to mergers and abuse of a dominant 
position, but the language in these provisions is similar to section 45 and Famula claims that adopting 
this test is appropriate (Famula, above n 132, 138). 
142 Famula, above n 132, 148. 
143 Famula, above n 132, 150. 
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automatic. At present in Canada, the defendant must have 35% of the market share 
before the court will consider whether they have market power. In addition, many 
other factors are relevant to this issue under section 45. For example, the case of R v. 
Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society identified the following factors: 144 
(a) the number of competitors and the concentration of competition; 
(b) baniers to entry; 
(c) geographical distribution of buyers and sellers; 
(d) differences in the degree of integration among competitors; 
(e) product differentiation; 
(f) countervailing power; and 
(g) cross-elasticity of demand. 
The amount of factors the court can consider, however, is not closed. 145 Nevertheless, 
the Canadian courts mainly use market share and the above factors in determining 
whether the defendant has market power under section 45. 
The third factor relevant to whether the conduct unduly affects competition is the 
behaviour of the defendant. The court undertakes this analysis by looking at the aim, 
and the likely effect, of the alleged anti-competitive agreement. Namely, if the 
agreement will unduly influence competition, this will obviously make a finding 
against the defendant more likely. In addition, the courts can also look at how the 
defendant carried out the agreement and any other behaviour that the court believes 
may decrease competition. 146 Finally, the court will then combine its findings on the 
defendant ' s market power and behaviour to determine whether the agreement will 
have an undue effect on competition. For example, the court may find a defendant 
liable under section 45 if they do not have substantial market power providing that 
their behaviour will cause great injury to competition.147 
144 R v. Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical Society (1992) 74 CCC (3d) 289, 321 (SCC). 
145 Famula, above n 132, 151. 
146 Nova Scotia, above n 144, 323-324; See: Famula, above n 132, 153. 
147 See: No va Scotia, above n 144, 324; See: Famula, above n 132, 154. 
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The final element of section 45 relates to mens rea. Clearly since section 45 is a 
criminal provision, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had a certain mental 
element. The CCA states that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended to 
enter the agreement, but not that they intended the agreement to unduly injure 
competition. 148 The Canadian case law has further developed these ideas by stating 
that the plaintiff could prove the required mens rea by showing two components. 
First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant intended to enter the agreement and 
had knowledge of the agreement's terms. By proving this component, therefore, the 
plaintiff shows the court that the defendant intended to carry out the agreement. 
Secondly, the plaintiff must show that, objectively speaking, the agreement would 
unduly lessen or prevent competition. 149 This objective test, therefore, is whether: 
A reasonable business person who can be presumed to be familiar with the 
business in which he or she engages would or should have known the likely 
effect of such an agreement would be to unduly lessen competition. 150 
If the plaintiff can prove these subjective and objective components beyond 
reasonable doubt, the court will find that the defendant had the requisite mens rea to 
be guilty under section 45. 
Overall, the Canadian legislature and courts have developed the criminal conspiracy 
provision in section 45 well. In addition, Canada has a record of aggressive 
prosecutions under this section. 151 New Zealand may wish to look to this section as a 
means to deter competition law offenders more effectively in the future. 
148 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 45(2.2). 
149 Nova Scotia, above n 144, 325-326; Famula, above n 132, 155. 
150 Nova Scotia, above n 144, 326. 
151 Bill Batchelor and Howard Adler Jr "Antitrust Criminalization Goes Global : Multinationals Should 
Beware" (2001) 8 No 10 Bus Crim Bui 1. 
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2 Section 36 
This section only provides for civil penalties and is somewhat similar to sections 82 
and 84A of the NZCA. This section states that any person who has suffered loss or 
damage that was caused by a person committing an offence under Part VI, or by a 
person's failure to comply with a CCA court order, can sue for an amount equal to 
this loss or damage. 152 This section, therefore, gives the possibility of a civil action 
when a criminal action under Part VI may be inappropriate. 153 
An important rationale behind this section is that certain anti-competitive conduct 
may be illegal, but not deserving of a criminal sanction under the CCA. 154 
Consequently, section 36 gives any individual who has suffered damage due to the 
defendant's anti-competitive conduct a civil right of redress. 155 The first point to note 
concerning this section is that the plaintiff must only prove that the conduct breached 
the CCA on the balance of probabilities. Section 36, therefore, makes it easier for the 
plaintiff to prove the actus reus of the offence and consequently the section provides 
the plaintiff with a remedy for a wider range of anti-competitive conduct. 156 
Secondly, the plaintiff does not have to prove that the defendant had any mens rea 
under this section. All the plaintiff needs to prove to the civil standard is that the 
behaviour was anti-competitive and that it caused him or her damage. Consequently, 
this also results in the plaintiff having an easier case to prove and the court being able 
d . . . d l fl to reme y more ant1-compet1tJve con uct. 
Thirdly, a private party is able to apply to the court for a remedy under this section. 
Section 36, therefore, enables private citizens to monitor and seek a remedy for anti-
152 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 36. 
153 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131,637. 
154 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131,669. 
155 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 36. 
156 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131 , 670. 
157 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131,670; See: Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 36(1 ). 
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competitive conduct themselves as opposed to having to rely on the Commissioner of 
Competition for a referral. Given all these factors, academics believe that this section 
has great potential to deter competition law offences.
158 
The final important point 1s that section 36 does not specifically outline what 
remedies for which the plaintiff can apply. From the section, it is clear that the 
plaintiff can recover both damages and the costs of their investigation of the case and 
the proceedings. 159 Academics have also argued, however, that plaintiffs may also be 
able to apply to the court for an injunction, 160 and the Canadian Federal Court has 
stated that there is a definite possibility that section 36 will allow the plaintiff to gain 
an injunction. 161 The range of remedies under section 36, therefore, has the potential 
to be extensive. 
As stated previously, section 36 of the CCA is similar to sections 82 and 84A of the 
NZCA. Section 36, therefore, does not offer much guidance as to possible reform 
options for New Zealand law. 
3 Section 79 
Someone breaches this section if they are in a position of market dominance and they 
engage in anti-competitive acts that substantially lessen competition. As a penalty, the 
Canadian Competition Tribunal may prohibit those people from taking part in that 
practice or take any action that is reasonable and necessary to remedy the market 
effects of these practices.162 This section, therefore, also provides for civil penalties, 
but it does have degree of overlap with the criminal penalties in Part Vl.
163 
158 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131,671 , 677 ; See: Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 36(1). 
159 Competition Act 1985 (Canada) , s 36(1). 
160 Janda and Bellemare, above n 1031672. 
161 Industrial Milk Producers Assn v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd [1989] 1 FC 463, 
487 (FC) . 
162 Competition Act (Canada), s 79. 
163 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131 , 637; Famula, above n 132, 150. The overlap is between sections 
79 and 45(l)(d) . It is not a complete overlap, however, because two or more people do not have to 
enter an agreement under section 79. In addition, the court cannot proceed, using the same facts, 
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Obviously, this is a general section that aiming at preventing those in a dominant 
position from undertaking acts that substantially lessen competition. If a defendant 
has market power, the Competition tribunal will hold them to be in a dominant 
position under this section. For example, the Tribunal has stated that: 
In deciding whether a firm has substantial or complete control of a market, one 
asks whether the firm has market power in the economic sense. Market power in 
the economic sense is the power to maintain prices above the competitive level 
without losing so many sales that the higher price is not profitable. It is the 
ability to earn supra-normal profits by reducing output and charging more than 
the competitive price for a product. 164 
As with section 36, the plaintiff need only prove that the defendant was in a dominant 
position on the balance of probabilities. 165 
In addition, the plaintiff does not need to prove that the defendant had mens rea as the 
Competition Tribunal deems the offender to intend the consequences of their actions 
under section 79. This section, therefore, also avoids the complex evidentiary issues 
that arise under section 45. 166 
The final issue is what penalties the Competition Tribunal may enforce against an 
offender. In addition to the prohibition orders mentioned above, the Competition 
Tribunal may also, under section 79, order the divestiture of assets or shares or make 
any other orders that are necessary to remedy the anti-competitive effects.
167 The 
Competition Tribunal, therefore, has extensive penalty powers to remedy this kind of 
against a person under both section 45 and section 79 (Competition Act 1985 (Canada), ss 79(7)(a) and 
45.1). 
164 Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Laidlaw Waste Systems Ltd (1992) 40 CPR (3d) 
289, 325 (Competition Tribunal). 
165 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131, 677 . 
166 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131, 673-674. 
167 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 79(2) . 
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conduct, without the plaintiff having to recourse to the courts. This could be a valid 
option for New Zealand; namely, Parliament could provide the Commission with 
more extensive powers with which to remedy breaches of section 36. The cease and 
desist order provisions in section 74A, however, may adequately fulfil this function in 
the future. 
4 Section 92 
This section prohibits mergers that do, or are likely to, substantially prevent or lessen 
competition. The Competition Tribunal has a variety of civil penalties at their 
disposal, such as the power to dissolve the merger, order the merger not to proceed or 
dispose of assets or shares. 168 This section also largely overlaps with section 45; 
namely, a merger that will substantially lessen competition under section 92 may also 
be an agreement that will unduly injure competition under section 45(1)(d). 169 
Under this section, the Commissioner applies to the Competition Tribunal and the 
Tribunal has to decide whether the merger has, or is likely to, substantially prevent or 
lessen competition. 170 In determining this, the Competition Tribunal looks at four 
factors. Firstly, the Tribunal defines the relevant product and the geographic market 
that the merger will influence. 171 
Secondly, the Tribunal calculates the market share and the concentration ratios in the 
market, and compares this with the merger threshold levels. Under this section, the 
threshold for a merged entity exercising a co-ordinated market power is a market 
share of at least 10% in a market where the largest four firms have a combined share 
of at least 65%. Conversely, for a merged entity under the exercise of unilateral 
market power the threshold is at least 35% of market share. 172 
168 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 92. The Tribunal does have other powers under this section. 
169 Note, however, that one can only choose to proceed under one of the sections 45, 79 or 92 
(Competition Act 1985 (Canada), ss 98, 79(7) and 45 .1) . 
17° Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 92. 
171 Garry K Goddard "Bank Mergers Policy and Competition Law Enforcement: A Comparison of 
Recent Experience in Australia and Canada" ( 1999-2000) 15 Bank Finance L Rev 181 , 208. 
172 Goddard, above n 171, 208. 
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Thirdly, the Tribunal contemplates the impact of certain factors that are relevant to 
their evaluation of whether the merger is anti-competitive.
173 The most important 
considerations are whether the merger will fail, barriers to entry and whether effective 
competition will remain after the merger. Generally, if the defendant can show that 
these factors are in its favour, the Tribunal will allow the merger to proceed.
174 
Finally, the court assesses whether the merger will produce economic efficiencies and 
if these outweigh the anti-competitive damage that the merger will cause.
175 Overall, 
therefore, the Tribunal undertakes a thorough analysis of the merger under section 92. 
In my opinion, this analysis has to be this detailed as the Tribunal has many penalties 
at its disposal under this section. Nevertheless, the NZCA also provides for a wide 
range of penalties for anti-competitive mergers and, in my opinion, section 92 of the 
CCA provides New Zealand with no further penalty options that may provoke reform. 
Overall, the penalty prov1s10ns m the CCA are comprehensive and developed. 
Sections 36 and 92, however, provide little in the way of reform options for New 
Zealand. The main reason for this is that New Zealand already contains similar 
penalties for like conduct under the NZCA. The above discussion, however, does 
show that at least New Zealand competition law penalties are consistent with other 
jurisdictions. In relation to section 79, the CCA does outline some extensive and wide 
penalty powers and New Zealand could look at such wide provisions to improve the 
range of competition law penalties available to the Commission. The new cease and 
desist order provision in the NZCA, however, may provide the Commission with 
enough power to achieve the same objectives as section 79 of the CCA. Nevertheless, 
by far the most interesting part in the CCA is the criminal conspiracy provision in 
section 45. New Zealand may do well to look at whether we should have criminal 
sanctions for serious competition law violations, or hard core cartel offences, and this 
paper focuses on this issue in Part IV. 
173 Competition Act 1985 (Canada), s 92( l ). 
174 Goddard, above 171, 208, 209. 
175 Goddard, above n 171, 208. 
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IV CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 
This part discusses the idea of criminal sanctions for certain anti-competitive 
behaviour in more detail. This part will first determine whether New Zealand does 
require criminal sanctions for competition law violations and, if so, what form these 
sanctions will take. In addition, this part outlines and analyses the general issues and 
arguments surrounding the idea of criminal sanctions. Secondly, this part discusses 
the idea of criminal liability for corporations. Overall, this part will show that criminal 
sanctions are appropriate for some competition law violations and that both 
individuals and corporations may be liable under this proposed reform option. 
A Criminal Sanctions Generally 
The first issue is whether New Zealand courts should be able to impose criminal 
sanctions upon a defendant for all, or just some, breaches of the NZCA.
176 One could 
argue that, if they were available, the courts should be able to impose criminal 
sanctions for any breaches of the NZCA. Certain kinds of anti-competitive conduct 
outlined in the NZCA, however, are more serious; consequently, criminal sanctions 
are more suitable for these offences. For example, Peter Allport argues that New 
Zealand should only have criminal sanctions for restrictive trade practices that Part II 
of the NZCA prohibits. 177 In my opinion, however, New Zealand should adopt an 
approach similar to that in Canada; namely, the courts should only be able to impose 
criminal sanctions for anti-competitive conspiracies or "hard core cartel" offences 
("cartel offences"). The reasons are that these competition law violations are 
obviously harmful, hard to detect and clearly illegal.
178 The courts, therefore, should 
not be able to impose criminal sanctions upon offenders who breach the NZCA's 
176 This paper refers to the court having this power and not the Commission. The reason for this is that 
the courts may be better equipped to deal with criminal sanctions. In addition, the courts currently have 
the majority of the penalty powers under the NZCA. It is far-fetched at present, therefore, to argue that 
the Commission should have the power to impose criminal sanctions. This is also consistent with the 
approach in Canada. 
177 Allport, above n 43, 276. 
178 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 24. 
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provisions on other anti-competitive conduct, such as business acquisitions and use of 
a dominant position. The reasons being that these are not as serious as cartel offences 
and it would be difficult for a plaintiff to prove these offences beyond reasonable 
doubt. 179 More reasons why the courts should only have criminal sanctions available 
for cartel offences will become apparent from the following discussion. At this point, 
however, it is crucial to note that the rest of this part only discusses the possibility of 
criminal sanctions in relation to cartel offences. 
The idea of deterrence is of the utmost importance to whether criminal sanctions are 
appropriate for cartel offences under the NZCA. As stated previously, before the 
Commerce Amendment Act 2001, certain penalties were not adequately deterring 
competition law offences. This was especially so in relation to the pecuniary penalty 
provisions in Part II of the NZCA.
18° Consequently, these penalties were not deterring 
people from committing cartel offences and therefore one could have argued that 
Parliament should have included a criminal penalty provision in the Commerce 
Amendment Act 2001. The 2001 amendments however still aim at deterring cartel 
offences and, since only recently in-force, one view is that New Zealand should wait 
and see whether these amendments will achieve deterrence before looking at the 
option of criminal sanctions.
181 Nevertheless, in my opinion there are persuasive 
reasons illustrating why criminal sanctions are the only true way to deter cartel 
offences and, consequently, New Zealand must seriously consider them as a reform 
option. 
In the United Kingdom, the Parliament's recent White Paper claims that only criminal 
sanctions, including imprisonment, are an adequate penalty for cartel offences. For 
example, the White Paper states that, to achieve deterrence, a penalty must recognise 
the fact that the United Kingdom only discovers one in six cartels. The penalty, 
therefore, must be six times greater than the offender' s illegal cartel gain. In relation 
to monetary penalties, however, this results in the penalty being from six to ten times 
179 See: Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 24. 
180 See: Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 24, and 3 l. 
181 See: Smith, above n 5, 291. The author made thi s statement in reference to Parliament 's recent 
enactment of the UKCA and then their subsequent White Paper outlining a desire for criminal 
sanctions for cartel offences. This argument, however, is also applicable to the New Zealand scenario. 
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greater than the UKCA's statutory maximum and it has the potential to make the 
defendant insolvent. Conversely, a criminal sanction will be a better deterrent as the 
prospect of a criminal record, or a term of imprisonment, will make the potential 
offender less likely to engage in the prohibited conduct.
182 
The New Zealand Commission has also raised the idea of criminal sanctions as 
having the potential to be an effective deterrent to competition law violations.
183 The 
Ministry of Commerce, however, has provided New Zealand with the most 
comprehensive discussion on this issue. The Ministry raises the point that cartels 
cause such great harm, and are so difficult to detect, that a civil monetary penalty that 
actually deters would be too large for the majority of offenders to pay. The only way 
to deter those offenders guilty of cartel offences, therefore, is for the court to impose 
upon them a criminal fine or term of imprisonment. The seriousness of these penalties 
would make any potential offender question their actions and, at the least, the threat of 
criminal sanctions would make people more aware of the law and the consequences of 
any violation. 184 Given this, the Ministry concludes that there is: 
A case for criminal fines for hard core cartel offences ... in the event that 
offenders cannot afford to pay the fines then imprisonment is appropriate ... if a 
corporate offender cannot pay the fine the directors should go to jail. 
185 
Some academics, however, claim that criminal sanctions will not be an effective 
deterrent to competition law violations. The common argument is that criminal 
sanctions will result in a number of procedural issues that reduce the ability of such 
sanctions to deter cartel offences.
186 These procedural issues are wide-ranging. For 
example, criminal sanctions will result in the plaintiff having to prove the case beyond 
reasonable doubt via compelling evidence and having to prove that the offender had 
182 Batchelor and Adler, above n 151 , 2. 
183 See: Allport, above n 43, 276. 
184 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 24-26. 
185 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 26. 
186 Smith, above n 5, 292. 
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the requisite mens rea. 187 In addition, criminal sanctions may result in the New 
Zealand Commission having less effective powers of investigation as the criminal law 
has more safeguards to protect the suspect. 188 Finally, the New Zealand Parliament 
would have to define precisely what is meant by a cartel offence, otherwise the 
criminal sanctions could deter conduct that is actually pro-competitive and, therefore, 
the sanctions would defeat their own objective. 189 Overall, criminal sanctions may 
reduce deterrence as these factors would make the law harder to enforce and would 
result in fewer convictions for cartel offences. 190 
These, however, are only procedural factors and the New Zealand Commerce 
Commissioner has stated that Parliament would be able to resolve these difficulties. 191 
In my opinion, this is clearly correct. Parliament could amend the NZCA enabling the 
Commission to have certain powers of investigation when seeking a criminal 
sanction, and they could quite easily define what they want cartel offences to 
encompass. In relation to the higher burden and the need to prove mens rea, this is a 
reason why the courts should only be able to apply criminal sanctions to cartel 
offences. Namely, other competition law offences would be too difficult for the 
plaintiff to prove under the criminal standards, but this is not the case for cartel 
offences. 192 In addition, there are further factors supporting the argument that criminal 
sanctions are required for cartel offences in New Zealand. 
187 Smith, above n 5, 291, 292; See: Famula, above 132, 155-157. 
188 
Smith, above n 5, 292. For example, the suspect has the right to silence and the right not to 
incriminate oneself. This could result in suspects not explaining certain issues that are crucial to the 
prosecution. 
189 Smith, above n 5, 291. Smith states: 
If the definition is too wide the offence may cover many forms of behaviour regarded by the 
public at large-and juries-as less morally reprehensible that price-fixing per se. If the offence is 
too narrowly drawn then businessmen intent on co-ordinating their prices will simply adopt 
form of behaviour that have that effect but fall short of the offence (sic). 
190 There are other factors against the view that criminal sanctions are appropriate for cartel offences. 
These include that arguments that they would discourage whistle blowing. Will such sanctions catch 
the right people? Will prison be the only sanction? Can the jury understand the issues? In my opinion, 
however, academics have not developed these arguments enough; they are mere speculation. This 
paper, therefore, does not deal with them. Note, however, that this paper is of the view that both 
criminal fines and imprisonment are appropriate sanctions for competition law violations. 
191 All port, above n 43, 276. 
192 See the discussion above on the criminal penalties under the CCA. 
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A point in favour of criminal sanctions that closely resembles the above discussion is 
that such penalties stigmatise the offender, whether it be a corporation or an 
individual, and this is advantageous for two reasons. 193 Firstly, the threat of criminal 
stigmatisation may add to the deterrent effect of the penalty by making the potential 
offender more aware of the consequences of their actions. Secondly, the fact that the 
penalty will stigmatise the offender relates to, and reflects the fact that, cartel offences 
are morally blameworthy. 194 The reason that cartel offences are morally blameworthy 
comes back to the principle of public interest. Since competition is supposed to be in 
the public interest and a competitive environment is a public benefit, if a cartel 
interferes illegally with this environment, the cartel's interference is criminally 
blameworthy. 195 
To illustrate this point further, people generally attempt to compare cartels with other, 
similar, illegal conduct. Commonly, people tend to compare cartel offences to theft. 
Obviously, in New Zealand theft is punishable by criminal sanctions. One could 
argue, however, that if New Zealand could create a civil penalty that would be an 
effective deterrent against theft, then we should abandon our criminal penalties in this 
respect. 196 This view, however, fails to see that retribution or punishment is a valid 
objective of the criminal penalties for theft. Namely, even if New Zealand could deter 
theft with civil sanctions, this would be inappropriate as criminal penalties formally 
condemn theft as morally blameworthy and can lead to stigmatisation and 
punishment. 197 Some people attempt to argue that cartel offences are similar to theft 
and, therefore, criminal sanctions are the only appropriate penalty. Namely, as with 
theft, the participant in a cartel takes wealth from other consumers in society. 
Differently from theft, however, is the fact that consumers actually consent to the 
193 Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 26. 
194 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131, 633 ; Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 24; Famula, above n 
132, 160-161. 
195 Famula, above n 132, 160-161; Janda and Bellemare, above n 131 , 636. 
196 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131, 634. 
197 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131 , 634. 
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cartel taking their wealth. Nevertheless, the cartel removes the consumers' ability to 
choose between competitive prices and, consequently, the cartel vitiates any consent 
the participants obtain. 198 
There are two other reasons why cartel offences are similar to theft. First, as with 
theft, the cartel does not simply transfer the wealth from the consumer to the 
producer, but a "dead-weight" loss also occurs. This refers to the loss that the 
participants in the cartel do not capture. 199 For example, this could include decreased 
consumer confidence in the principle of a competitive market or the fact that 
consumers cannot choose to apply to other areas of the economy the wealth the cartel 
has taken. Secondly, participants in a cartel use quite elaborate techniques to keep 
their activities secret, and this shows that they fear prosecution and people defining 
their conduct as anti-consumer. As with theft, therefore, the offenders know they are 
guilty of wrongful behaviour that is deserving of punishment and public outrage.200 
In my opinion, the analogy of cartel offences with theft is a valid one for the reasons 
already mentioned. There is no persuasive reason, from either common sense or 
philosophical perspectives, why Parliament should define cartel offences as civil 
wrongs and theft as criminally blameworthy. All that the difference between theft 
(criminal wrong) and cartel offences (civil wrong) shows, is that the mindset of 
"white-collar" offences being less blameworthy than other "blue-collar" crimes still 
largely applies to policy makers in New Zealand.20 1 
198 Janda and Bellemare, above n 131, 635. The authors also argue that cartels are similar to criminal 
fraud in this respect. Namely, the cartel participants do not disclose how they set the price to consumers 
and there is the false appearance of competition. A cartel, or price fixing arrangement, therefore, is 
analogous to a fraudulent price. 
199 P S Crampton and J T Kissack "Recent Developments in Conspiracy Law and Enforcement: New 
Risks and Opportunities" (1993) 38 McGill LJ 569,586. 
200 Famula, above n 132, 162; P L Warner and M J Trebilcock "Fixing Price-Fixing Laws" (1996) 17 C 
Comp Ree 48, 51. 
201 The Ministry of Commerce, above n 7, 27-30 has also raised the point that cartel offences could be 
similar to tax and customs duty evasion, which are offences punishable by criminal penalties in New 
Zealand. The Ministry did not come to any final view on this issue, but their discussion does indicate 
that the comparison may be valid. From the Ministry's discussion of the issue, it is my opinion that this 
comparison is also accurate. In fact, cartel offences may be more serious than tax and customs duty 
evasion, the reason being that cartel offences more directly affect the public and the economy. A 
cynical view, however, could be that Parliament will only make white-collar offences that directly 
affect their wealth criminal, as with tax evasion, while those having a more direct affect on the public 
will merely be civil wrongs. 
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Overall, it is my opinion that New Zealand should, under the NZCA, have available 
the option of criminal fines and imprisonment for cartel offences. These offences are 
serious, clearly illegal and difficult to detect. The option of criminal penalties would 
be a greater deterrent for potential offenders and would consequently reduce the 
amount of cartel offences in New Zealand. In addition, criminal penalties will rightly 
stigmatise the offender as cartel offences are morally blameworthy and contrary to the 
public interest. There are also persuasive arguments that cartel offences are analogous 
to theft and tax and customs duty evasion, which are all punishable by criminal 
penalties in New Zealand. Criminal sanctions are, therefore, a valid option for reform 
and, in my opinion, one that Parliament must implement to reflect the seriousness of, 
and better deter, cartel offences under the NZCA. The final issue, however, is exactly 
how the Courts in New Zealand will be able to find corporations criminally liable for 
cartel offences if Parliament does adopt the reform option of criminal sanctions. 
B Corporate Criminal Liability 
To find a corporation liable for a cartel offence, the court must be able to impute the 
corporation with the conduct of its employees.202 The courts will do this via the 
doctrine of corporate criminal liability and, in short, this refers to the extent to which 
a court can hold a corporation criminally responsible for acts and omissions of 
individuals within the company.203 This part discusses the law in New Zealand 
relating to corporate criminal liability for mens rea offences. In addition , this part 
briefly compares the law in New Zealand with that in Canada and the United States. 
This part also outlines the three main policy arguments for and against the doctrine of 
corporate criminal liability. 
202 This is because, in the strict sense, the corporation never does anything; only by acting via 
individuals can the corporation act at all. 
203 See: Joseph DiMento, Gilbert Geis and Julia Gelfand "Corporate Criminal Liability: A 
Bibliography" (2000/2001) 28 Western St UL Rev I, 2. 
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1 New Zealand law 
The leading case in New Zealand relating to corporate criminal liability is Nordik v. 
Inland Revenue.204 This case directly concerned s 228(1)(b) of the Land and Income 
Tax Act 1954, but is more important for the comments of Cooke J (as he then was) in 
relation to corporate criminal liability in New Zealand. Cooke J referred to the 
decision of the House of Lords in Tesco v. Nattrass205 and decided that the law of the 
United Kingdom was applicable in New Zealand.206 The principle one extracts from 
these decisions is that corporations will be criminally liable for mens rea offences if 
the individual committing the offence acted as the company and if this individual's 
mind was the mind of the company. 207 Generally, if the individual was the "directing 
mind" of the corporation, the corporation will be criminally liable for the mens rea 
offence.208 Commonly, individuals in a corporation satisfy this "directing mind" 
element if they are included in the board of directors, managing directors, or other 
superior members of the corporation who carry out managerial functions and act and 
speak for the company.209 Academics and judges have conveniently labelled this 
principle as the doctrine of identification. 210 
After applying this test, the House of Lords in Tesco v. Nattrass determined that a 
manager of one of Tesco's supermarkets could not be included among the directing 
minds of the company.211 Conversely, Cooke Jin Nordik v. Inland Revenue found that 
one could easily class a managing director as the directing mind of the company.212 
204 Nordik Industries Ltd v. Regional Controller of Inland Revenue [1976) 1 NZLR 194 (SC). 
205 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass [1971] 2 All ER 127 (HL). 
206 Nordik v. Inland Revenue, above n 204, 201. 
207 Tesco v. Nattrass, above n 205, 131 per Lord Reid, 140 per Lord Morris, 148 per Lord Pearson; 
Nordik v. Inland Revenue, above n 204, 202-203. 
208 Tesco v. Nattrass, above n 205, 132 per Lord Reid; Nordik v. Inland Revenue, above n 204, 199. 
209 Nordik v. Inland Revenue, above n 204, 201-202. 
210 Nordik v. Inland Revenue, above n 204, 199; Celia Wells "A Quiet Revolution in Corporate 
Liability for Crime" (1995) 145 N Law J 1326. 
211 Tesco v. Nattrass, above n 205, 127. It must be borne in mind, however, that there were several 
hundred Tesco supermarket managers, each located in one ofTesco's many stores. 
212 Nordik v. Inland Revenue, above n 204, 202-203. Note that these two cases are clearly reconcilable. 
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In recent times, however, the doctrine of identification has come under scrutiny in 
both the United Kingdom and New Zealand. Some academics have argued that 
modem cases have confused the identification doctrine and now the doctrine of 
vicarious liability, or the "scope of employment test", is the test the court should use 
to hold corporations liable for mens rea offences.213 This means that if any of a 
corporation's employees commit a mens rea crime, the court can attribute this to the 
corporation provided the employee committed the crime in the course of their 
employment. 214 
In New Zealand, Lord Hoffman in the Judicial Committee addressed this point when 
the Committee used the scope of employment test to find a company liable for the 
acts of their employees.215 The Court of Appeal in Linework Ltd v. Department of 
Labour216 followed this reasoning when they found that the scope of employment rule 
could attribute to the company the criminal conduct of a foreman in charge of a work 
site. Wickins and Ong argue that Meridian v. Securities, and therefore Linework Ltd v. 
Department of Labour, disposes of the identification doctrine and restricts it to 
exceptional circumstances.217 With respect, however, in my opinion this is overstating 
the effect of the Meridian v. Securities case. Lord Hoffman states in Meridian v. 
Securities that what test the court will use depends upon the statute the court is 
interpreting and only that this was such a case where use of the identification doctrine 
was inappropriate.218 In addition, Linework Ltd v. Department of Labour provides no 
213 R J Wickins and CA Ong "Confusion Worse Confounded: The End of the Directing Mind Theory" 
[1997] JBL 524, 553. The authors refer to the following cases in detail: El Ajou v. Dollar Land 
Holdings PLC [1994] 2 All ER 685 (CA); Re Supply of Ready Mixed Concrete (No. 2), Director of 
Fair Trading v. Pioneer Concrete (U.K) Ltd [1995] 2 All ER 135 (HL); Meridian Global Funds 
Management Asia Ltd v. Securities Commission [1995] 3 NZLR 7 (Judicial Committee). 
214 Wickins & Ong, above n 213,553. 
215 Meridian v. Securities Commission, above n 213, 7, 16. 
216 Linework Ltd v. Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639 (CA). 
217 Wickins & Ong, above n 213,553. 
218 Meridian v. Securities Commission, above n 213, 7, 16. Lord Hoffman states: 
Their Lordships would wish to guard themselves against being understood to mean that whenever a 
servant of a company has authority to do an act on its behalf, knowledge of that act will for all 
purposes be attributed to the company. It is a question of construction in each case as to whether 
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support for the view that the identification doctrine is inappropriate for mens rea 
crimes. This is because this case concerned section 50 of the Health and Safety in 
Employment Act 1992, which is an offence not requiring any mens rea. 219 
Furthermore, general texts on corporate criminal liability state that the identification 
doctrine is still the primary way for a court to hold a corporation criminally liable for 
mens rea offences in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.220 
Overall, it seems that the courts will still use the identification doctrine in most 
circumstances to find corporations liable for mens rea crimes. It is likely, therefore, 
that the courts will use this doctrine to find corporations liable if Parliament was to 
make cartel offences punishable by criminal sanctions. 
2 Canada 
The law relating to corporate criminal liability for mens rea offences in Canada is, for 
the most part, identical to that of the United Kingdom. The leading decision in Canada 
is Canadian Dredge, and this case adopts the law of the United Kingdom from Tesco 
v. Nattrass.
221 
The court in Canadian Dredge stated that, when dealing with criminal 
offences requiring mens rea, whether or not the court finds the corporation liable 
depends on the application of the identification doctrine.222 The Canadian courts, 
however, have qualified this by stating that it can only operate when: 
The action taken by the directing mind (a) was within the field of operation assigned to 
him; (b) was not totally in fraud of the corporation; and (c) was by design or result partly 
for the benefit of the company (sic). 223 
the particular rule requires that the knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with 
which it was done, should be attributed to the company. 
219 
Linework Ltd v. Department of Labour, above n 216,639. 
220 
Buddle Findlay The Laws of New Zealand: Companies (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 20-23; 
Lord Hailsham Halsbury 's Laws of England: Companies (4 ed, Butterworths, London, 1996) paras 
1157, 1158; Lord Hailsham Halsbury 's Laws of England: Criminal Law, Evidence and Procedure (4 
ed, Butterworths, London, 1996) para 35. 
221 Canadian Dredge & Dock Co Ltd et al v. The Queen (1985) 19 DLR (4th) 314 (SCC). 
222 Canadian Dredge, above n 221, 328. 
223 Canadian Dredge, above n 221,351. 
LAW LIBRNlY 
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In addition, another mmor difference between the law of Canada and the United 
Kingdom is that in Canada the courts have applied the doctrine more widely. Namely, 
more individuals within the relevant corporation will come within the meaning of the 
"directing mind" under Canadian law.224 
3 United States 
Conversely, courts in the United States use the doctrine of respondeat superior to find 
corporations criminally liable for mens rea offences. 225 This doctrine contains three 
main elements. First, an individual must have committed the actus reas with the 
required mens rea.
226 
Secondly, the individual must have been acting within the scope 
of his or her employment.227 Finally, the individual must have committed the crime 
with the intention of providing the corporation with a benefit.228 As well as having a 
different test, therefore, it is clear that corporate criminal liability in the United States 
is much wider than that of the United Kingdom, New Zealand or even Canada.229 As 
stated previously, however, some authors have argued that courts in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand are moving towards a "scope of employment" doctrine.230 
224 
Eric Colvin "Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability" (1995] Crim LF 1, 10. In addition, in 
Canada a corporation may have more than one directing mind (Canadian Dredge, above n 221,337). 
225 
See: New York Central & Hudson River v. United States (1909) 212 US 481. 
226 
V S Khanna "Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?" (1996) 109 Harv L Rev 
1477, 1489. Khanna expand on this at 1489: 
If a particular agent, regardless of rank in the corporation, had the necessary state of mind, this 
mens rea can be imputed to the corporation. Alternatively, mens rea can be shown on the basis of 
the 'collective knowledge' of the employees as a group. 
227 Khanna, above n 226, 1489. At 1489, Khanna states: 
The scope of employment includes any act that 'occurred while the offending employee was 
carrying out a job-related activity. In fact, this requirement is so broad that courts may hold 
corporations liable even when corporations have forbidden the wrongful activities. 
228 Khanna, above n 226, 1490. At 1490, Khanna explains: 
The employee need not act with the exclusive purpose of benefiting the corporation, and the 
corporation need not actually receive the benefit. 
229 Khanna, above n 226, 1490. 
230 Wickins & Ong, above n 213,554. 
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In part at least, this could be due to a desire to be more in line with the law of the 
United States, especially given that countries strong economic standing.231 
4 Policy arguments 
There are three main arguments used both in support, and in opposition, to the 
doctrine of corporate criminal liability. First, supporters of corporate criminal liability 
argue that only by holding a corporation criminally liable can the law adequately deter 
future criminal acts by corporations.232 More specifically, by finding a corporation 
criminally liable and by imposing on that corporation criminal penalties, the courts 
will be able to reduce offences by that, and other, corporations.233 Opponents of this 
doctrine, however, reply to this by claiming that the courts will be able to meet this 
deterrence objective just as well, if not better, by finding corporations only civilly 
liable.234 Overall, there is no conclusive statistical evidence relating to this point, but 
my opinion is that finding a corporation criminally liable will be a better deterrent. 
The main reason being that the public perception is that criminal penalties are more 
serious than civil sanctions. Common sense suggests, therefore, that corporations will 
be less likely to breach laws carrying the more serious criminal penalties. 
Proponents of the doctrine also claim that corporate criminal liability is the best 
method to fulfil the retribution rationale for punishment. Namely, corporate criminal 
liability is the only doctrine that will adequately punish corporations for their 
criminality.235 Opponents reply to this argument by claiming that corporate criminal 
23 1 Compare: Wickins & Ong, above n 213,554. Differently to me, the authors at 554 state that English 
courts may actually be striving for compatibility with European law: 
Another reason [for the change in doctrines] may be a desire to harmonize English company law 
with continental law, where rigid categorization of how the acts of directors and others bind a 
company appear less in evidence. 
232 DiMento, Geis & Gelfand, above n 203, 2. 
233 See: Stephen A Saltzburg "The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organisations" (1991) Bost UL Rev 
421,430. 
234 For a detailed formulation of this argument see: Khanna, above n 226, 1477. 
235 For a detailed argument in support of this point see: Lawrence Friedman "In Defense of Corporate 
Criminal Liability" (2000) 23 Harv JL & Pub Pol'y 833. 
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liability is not the only way to satisfy the retribution doctrine. Opponents do this by 
arguing that the courts can adequately punish a corporation via civil liability, and 
therefore courts do not need to rely upon criminal liability.236 Opponents also claim 
that corporate criminal liability exceeds the intended purpose of the retribution 
doctrine, as it punishes people who are innocent of the crime. Such people could 
include shareholders, employees and those who live in the community around the 
relevant corporation.
237 Nevertheless, even if corporate criminal liability does punish 
innocent people, this is even the case with individual criminal Iiability.238 The fact is 
that, the need to punish the corporation for the crime outweighs the suffering the 
penalty causes to innocent people and corporate criminal liability is the most effective 
way to fulfil this retributive objective. In my opinion, therefore, corporate criminal 
liability is the best means to punish the corporation. 
Finally, supporters of the doctrine also argue that corporate criminal liability 
stigmatises the company. This, supporters claim, has the beneficial result of damaging 
the corporation's reputation, and any criminal conviction "constitutes a lasting public 
statement that the organisation itself should be blamed for the violation."239 
Opponents, however, reply to this with the claim that stigmatisation of the corporation 
is hardly ever socially desirable and, even when it is, civil sanctions can adequately 
fulfil this need.240 In my opinion, however, civil sanctions do not adequately 
stigmatise the corporate offender because of the correct public perception that 
criminal penalties are more serious. In addition, it is often socially desirable to 
stigmatise the corporation as the corporation itself may be criminally responsible for 
certain acts and not just the employees. For example, there is no reason why a court 
236 Khanna, above n 226, 1532. 
237 DiMento, Geis & Gelfand, above n 203, 3. 
238 For example, if a someone is a court convicts someone of murder and sentences them to ten years in 
prison, this may punish innocent people. Namely, what if this person is the single parent of a child? 
The innocent child clearly suffers from not having a parent, but the need to fulfil retribution outweighs 
even this innocent child's suffering. This is what happens with corporate criminal liability; the need to 
punish the corporation outweighs the harm the penalty causes to innocent people. In addition, it is 
arguable that shareholders, and maybe even employees, are not innocent of the offence in the first 
place. People in the community, however, would probably be innocent. 
239 Saltzburg, above n 233, 431-432. 
24° Khanna, above n 226, 1499, 1508. 
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should not be able to state that a corporation that encourages breaches of the criminal 
law is responsible for the crime in question. 
Overall, if Parliament made cartel offences punishable by criminal sanctions, the 
courts could find the corporation itself liable and it is likely that they would do this 
via the identification doctrine, as would the courts in the United Kingdom and 
Canada. The United States, however, uses the doctrine of respondeat superior and 
there is an argument that New Zealand and the United Kingdom may be moving more 
in line with the law of the United States. Relating to the policy arguments, there are 
persuasive claims both for and against corporate criminal liability. In my opinion, 
however, if one has to come to a view it should be that they all favour the doctrine of 
corporate criminal liability. The general doctrine of corporate criminal liability, 
therefore, is unlikely to change substantially in the near future, and it will provide a 
means for the court to hold corporations liable for cartel offences should Parliament 
make these punishable with criminal sanctions. 
V CONCLUSION 
To be effective in New Zealand, competition law penalties under the NZCA must 
satisfy the main objectives of specific and general deterrence, and retribution. 
Currently, the penalties under the NZCA are reasonably extensive and have many 
admirable features. In my opinion, however, they are not fulfilling these objectives as 
well as they could, and Parliament should look to other jurisdictions to try to identify 
whether they can make any improvements to the penalty provisions in the NZCA. 
The penalty provisions under the UKCA are reasonably broad and give the Director a 
wide range of powers, but certain principles justifiably narrow how the Director can 
use these penalties. In Canada, the penalty provisions under the CCA are also 
extensive and, as of late, have been very effective. The New Zealand Parliament may 
want to look at some of the reform options this paper has raised in order to make the 
NZCA more effective. In my opinion, however, the most appealing reform option for 
Parliament is to give the courts the power to impose criminal sanctions upon 
offenders who commit cartel offences. 
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This paper's general discussion on criminal sanctions for cartel offences has 
determined that Parliament must seriously discuss the possibility of adding such 
criminal sanctions to the NZCA. In fact, it is my opinion that Parliament must make 
cartel offences punishable by criminal sanctions. In addition, if Parliament was to 
adopt this reform option, the courts could impose these sanctions upon both the 
individual offender and the corporation itself. Although it is undergoing some minor 
judicial changes, the courts may still find a corporation criminally liable for cartel 
offences under the doctrine of corporate criminal liability. 
Overall, this paper maintains that the penalty provisions under the NZCA are not a 
effective as they could be and that the reform option of criminal sanctions for cartel 
offences is something that Parliament must seriously consider. 
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